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Rewarding Sacrifice – A Conceptual Proposition

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Abstract

This article departs from the approach, drawn from the bellicose school of state formation, according to which the state mobilizes the war sacrifice of its citizenry in return for rewards that different groups reap from military service. However, a significant gap in this school can be identified in the lack of analysis of the variations in the level of such rewards. To this end, this article further develops the concept of *convertibility*. Convertibility refers to the ability of groups to convert the power they acquire from military service into valuable social rewards in the civilian sphere, including, first and foremost, access to rights. It is argued that variations in the value of rewards are best determined by their convertibility. Convertibility is highly affected by the level of militarization in a society through five variables: military participation ratio, level of threat, republicanism, convergence between military and civilian organizations, and identity-building.

Introduction

How does the state encourage individuals to willingly sacrifice their lives for their country? This unresolved problem has always troubled social scientists. Knowing how to mobilize for war has long been a challenge for Western societies. Scholars have paid much attention to this process; however gaps still remain in addressing the mechanisms that contribute to the mobilization for war, especially with regard to the sacrifice that it entails.

This article departs from a common, though not undisputed, approach, drawn from the bellicose school of state formation, regarding the affinity between state formation and war preparation. This approach can be termed the *republican exchange*. Within the terms of this exchange, the state mobilizes its citizenry to sacrifice in war in return for rights and protection.

In his famous "war makes state" argument, Tilly (1992) showed how the extensive introduction of artillery and gunpowder in 16th and 17th century warfare led state agencies to recruit resources for military build-up. State activities aimed at preparing for and legitimizing war, even without waging war *in actum*, became a lever for internal state expansion by means of administrative concentration (Barnett 1992; Giddens 1985; Mann 1993).

In turn, the extraction of resources led to patterns of bargaining between the state and groups that controlled the human and material resources needed for waging war. In this reciprocal arrangement, citizens were willing to sacrifice their lives (as soldiers) and their wealth (as taxpayers), to bear the costs of war and preparations for it, in return for security, as well as the civil, political, and social rights granted to them by the state (Janowitz 1976; Kier & Krebs 2010, 8-9; Tilly 1997, 193-215). This exchange promoted democratization and the development of the welfare state (Skocpol 1992; Tilly 1997, 193-215). Furthermore, providing social welfare and political rights was instrumental in strengthening the loyalty of the masses to the ruling regime, particularly with the advent of mass armies in the 19th century that armed those masses (Andreski 1954, 69-70). This process formed the republican exchange. Central to the republican exchange is the institution of the citizen-soldier, according to which soldiering (and related forms of sacrifice) forms a critical criterion for the allocation of civilian rights. The extent of the resources extracted from society determines the resources available to the armed forces, thus molding the state's military policies (Barnett 1992).

Nonetheless, although scholars produced substantial literature on how states reward for sacrifice, they did not theorize the dynamic nature of the scale of the rewards that the state provides in exchange for sacrifice, nor the factors determining variations in this scale. Answering this question requires examining the "exchange rate" between sacrifice and rewards, and analyzing how much a citizen receives in social rewards for his or her human support in the military. Dealing with this rate of exchange is important beyond bridging the theoretical gap identified in the existing literature. Fluctuations in the scale of reward may affect the level of societal willingness to sacrifice, as attested to by the legitimation crisis of the draft system that Western states have experienced since the 1970s and the rise of casualty shyness since the 1960s. This, then, invites us to evaluate the extent to which such fluctuations reflect changes in the level of reward, which, in turn negatively affect the willingness to sacrifice.

To this end, this article further develops the concept of *convertibility*, which refers to the ability of groups to convert the power they acquire through military service into valuable social rewards in the civilian sphere; first and foremost, as access to rights (Levy 2007). Yet, this concept remains underdeveloped with regard to the factors determining degree of convertibility. It is argued that variations in the value of rewards are best determined by their convertibility. Convertibility is highly affected by the level of militarization in society through five variables: military participation ratio, level of threat, republicanism, convergence between military and civilian organizations, and identity-building. Due to exogenous factors, however, such as cultural and market processes, the same variables that hitherto worked to sustain convertibility may also work in the opposite direction, reducing convertibility, and by implication, giving rise to demilitarization.

The article proceeds as follows: the next section analyzes the essence of convertibility. It is followed by two sections that present the variables affecting convertibility, and the conditions that lead to its decline. This study spans an era ranging from the period of state formation to the 1970s-1980s with special focus on the era of conscript armies. It focuses on compensation for human recruitment, where the sacrifice is more costly and concrete, rather than on monetary mobilization.

My aim in this article is to develop a theory. The propositions offered here can be viewed as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry (seeVan Evera 1994). It therefore draws upon, but also integrates and reframes, existing theories and observations.

Convertibility

Armies always reward soldiers in ways that are valuable in civilian life. Soldiers figure in two reward systems simultaneously: (1) *material rewards*, which are essentially monetary and generally immediate, such as salaries, pensions, job training, housing, financial aid for higher education, health services, and other social goods; and (2) *symbolic rewards*, which stem from the prestige and honor associated with military service. While material rewards with monetary value have a clear worth outside the military, the value of symbolic rewards in civilian society depends on the social context. In general, the honor and prestige enjoyed by soldiers are significant to the extent that they are socially recognized in the civilian sphere in a manner that facilitates their conversion into social assets (Levy 2007).

Therefore, the value of symbolic rewards is determined by their convertibility. Conversion is the transformation of a symbolic asset from one form to another. Convertibility refers to the ability of groups to convert the power they acquire from military service into valuable social positions in the civilian sphere. Because their value remains fixed, purely monetary rewards are not usually converted. In contrast, symbolic rewards are modified in the transition from the military to the civilian sphere. The level of convertibility determines the “exchange rate,” namely, how much a citizen gets back in social rewards for his or her active contribution to the military.

Different kinds of convertible symbolic resources can be identified and were in force, mainly in the historical period of state-making and the era of total wars (primarily since the 18th century), which lasted until about the 1960s.

Historically, military service shaped the criteria for, and hence was a hallmark of, citizenship and other rights, ranging from the political to the social. Conceiving of military sacrifice as the supreme civic obligation (Oldfield 1990), and transforming subjects into citizens to fight as soldiers in defense of their new republic (Burk 2002) neatly reflected the republican tradition that ascribed great value to active participation in democratic politics in order to promote the

common good. The extension of franchise in the U.S. and Europe to women and younger people following wars, the opportunities provided to war veterans by the GI Bill of Rights in post-WWII in the U.S., and the lowering of the national voting age in the U.S. during the Vietnam War, all attest to this linkage between sacrifice and rights. Sometimes rewards are paid during wartime to mobilize sacrifice; sometimes rewards are provided after the war to compensate for sacrifice, as war mobilization generates postwar expectations or empowers groups to claim new gains (Kier & Krebs 2010). However, postwar rewards can be linked to the effort to guarantee future sacrifice required for preparation for war.

Over time, working class groups, ethnic minorities, and gradually, women and homosexuals all strove to utilize military service as a mechanism for (expected) social mobility. Unlike the middle-class, whose right to serve had already been established, access to arms for these groups entailed breaking down barriers that had hitherto prevented their participation in the military. After all, the very status of a given group within military ranks may serve as a strong indicator of the extent to which it is trusted by the state, especially if the group is socially marginalized. Similarly, the esteem in which the group is held in the military may signify its potential ability to convert military status into social status (Krebs 2006).

Convertibility is thus largely determined by the citizenship discourse. As Krebs' analysis nicely shows, the more discourse is predicated on republican underpinnings, the higher the rate of convertibility. This linkage may explain the mechanism of claim-making: it can take the form of groups claiming unrestricted recruitment as a means of removing barriers to their social position, (as typified by the struggles of women and homosexuals), or efforts, (such as those of African-Americans following WW II), to convert past sacrifice in war into access to rights. Likewise, majority groups may demand the enlistment of minority groups in order to match their duties to already attained rights (such as the application of military service to second-generation foreign immigrants in France in the 1880s (see Brubaker 1992, 104-105). This is why convertibility applies to social networks more than to the enlistees alone.

By differentially classifying social groups, military service not only determines uniform eligibility for citizenship, but also establishes its hierarchical status (see Soysal 1994). Social hierarchies were constructed around the status of soldiering, distinguishing between groups included versus those excluded from the military and between combatants to those relegated to marginal, non-heroic roles. Militarized socialization works to instill and reproduce such social

differentiation by glorifying the combatants, or at least those serving in a voluntary force (Levy & Sasson-Levy 2008).

Examples of social hierarchies include (1) the male-dominated system of war that influences intergender power relations in society (Goldstein 2001); (2) the privileged social position of dominant groups in the military, such as the *Ashkenazim* in Israel, who converted their preeminence in the military into social dominance, or the U.S. military's historical role in entrenching the inferior position of African-Americans in society (Levy 1998); (3) the aggrandizement of warrior groups, such as the Japanese Samurai class (Ikegami 1995); (4) the role of the French *Levée en Masse* of 1793, which created the status of the citizen-soldier by declaring that all men were equally liable for service regardless of social distinction, thereby introducing a new language of citizenship, rights and duties, and moral legitimation. With the assimilation of this language into French discourse, the social mobility of the middle class gained legitimacy (Forrest 2003). Furthermore, as the case of Israel shows, rivalry between groups helps exclusionary policies of recruitment increase the value of military service for those groups serving in the armed forces. In this example, the exclusion of Palestinian citizens positively impacts the status of *Mizrahim* (immigrants from Muslim countries) who serve (Shafir & Peled 2002). With the creation of such social hierarchies, unequal burden was translated into, and was thereby compensated by, privileged social position.

Allocation of political rights in return for military sacrifice was another type of rights allotment, and often took the form of civilian control over the armed forces. The citizen-soldier embodied the republican model of transferring sovereignty from the ruler to the community of citizens who staffed and politically controlled the military. At first, the establishment of representative institutions helped monitor military organizations, insofar as parliaments allocated money from the citizenry to the army (Downing 1992). Gradually, with the establishment of the link between military and political participation, the decision to go to war was conditional on the support of the local community; namely, those directly shouldering the burden of war, and the social groups sending their children to military service. War could not be waged without popular consent (Tilly 1992). Given this situation, collective action began to appear in the 1960s and focused on issues of war and peace, and the human and material resources needed to support these policies (Everts 2002).

Prominent among these collective actors were war veterans and groups of women such as the Australian *Save Our Sons (SOS)*, which protested the Vietnam War, or the Israeli *Four Mothers* who protested the Lebanon War. Both types of groups used their republicanism-informed military contribution as soldiers or mothers to legitimize their cause. Invoking republicanism, especially with regard to gender, was particularly significant because women were usually barred from the battlefield and therefore were not entitled to the same rights and privileges as men. This 'gendered division of citizenship' renders men the sole authority to speak on security issues, not only in parliaments and governments, but also in the public and private spheres, and constrains women's political voice on these issues (see Tickner 2006). In sum, convertibility extends to access to substantive political rights by means of a political voice.

Against this background, symbolic rewards are mainly germane to democracies (and authoritarian regimes with republican principles). In many autocratic regimes, however, membership in the military produces direct advantages rather than the creation of a social contract.

Complementing the impact of military hierarchy is the transferability of skills learned in the military to the civilian labor market. Beyond purely professional skills, military service provides social capital by imparting values of discipline and responsibility, and by preparing individuals to operate in a bureaucratic environment. Civilian employers may therefore use service in the military to distinguish between more or less productive workers, with status attained in the military serving as a screening device (De Tray 1982; Teachman 2004). Furthermore, soldiers assigned to labor-intensive jobs are in practice being prepared for blue-collar jobs in civilian life, namely, low-status work in advanced capitalist societies. On the other hand, officers and soldiers serving in technology-intensive posts will be better prepared for white-collar jobs after they are discharged (Weede 1992).

Military service is also effective as a setting in which different groups, such as ethnic minorities, can mold their own unique identity through intense, and very often, competitive interactions within a cohesive military unit. As can be inferred from Weber, service in mass armies was instrumental in eliminating barriers between groups and classes, and consequently promoted the rise of civic associations (Titunik 2005, 147-148). Groups can leverage their emergent

identity for collective action outside the military, as suggested by the case of African-Americans in the U.S. military (Enloe 1980; Krebs 2006).

While material rewards are provided directly to service members within the military organization (first and foremost as salaries but also via other benefits in the areas of education, healthcare etc.), symbolic rewards change their form and produce benefits only outside the military. Against this background, symbolic rewards are best measured in terms of their convertibility – their conversion from military resources to valuable social resources – rather than their face value.

How does convertibility work?

Variables of Convertibility

Figure 1 illustrates the process affecting convertibility.

Figure 1: Convertibility Variables



Convertibility is largely determined by the level of militarization in society. Militarization, according to the combined definition of Lutz (2002, 723) and Mann (1987), refers to the extent to which war and preparations for war are regarded as normal and even desirable social

activities. This outlook develops through a process of discourse involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. This definition, which captures the processes that have taken place in many industrial societies during the past 60 years, is favored over alternative definitions. It moves beyond the narrow focus on the military's institutions, influence and resources and assumes that militarism is a socially-and politically-driven phenomenon.

Therefore, the ability of a society to continuously extract resources for war and for preparations for war is contingent on the social arrangements that reward soldiery and the soldiers' social networks. The discursive initiation of an external threat may be sufficient to drive the first waves of societal mobilization forward, but it is not enough to keep the process going, as it demands more and more social sacrifice. However, with militarization-incited state-building, such arrangements that enable convertibility along the patterns described above are promoted. Militarization facilitates convertibility due to the following factors:

(1) MPR- High levels of militarization historically entailed a high military participation ratio (MPR). A high MPR conveyed a more equitable distribution of sacrifice and thus made it more legitimate (Levi 1997). Making it appear as if the burden of war was evenly distributed mitigated internal disputes that would have otherwise downgraded the value of the sacrifice. Thus, when many people are touched by sacrifice, national rituals emerge that extol those who bear the burden (Marvin & Ingle 1999). The prototype soldier represents (even falsely) the cross-section of the population by which it celebrates the national character (see Kohn 1981, 554-555). High MPR thus increases convertibility.

The relationship between MPR and convertibility may appear, however, as curvilinear rather than simply linear. Universal conscription eliminates the possibility of convertibility if everyone can convert their military service into tangible benefits in civilian life. Yet, not only is the universalization of military service essential for imbuing the service with supreme value, it also does not decrease convertibility. Under universal conscription, groups vary in the level of sacrifice they bear and the level of benefits produced from this sacrifice, thus molding the above-mentioned social hierarchies.

It is true, moreover, that the state can bestow high symbolic status on privileged groups when other groups are excluded from the service, as had happened prior to the universalization of service in many democracies; however, this process cannot continue for long. In general, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the access of groups to power in the military determines whether the conversion of military status into social status will proceed in an orderly fashion or trigger inter-group tensions. When seemingly universal criteria for recruitment and promotion are coupled with the conferring of existential meaning on the application and consequences of those criteria, privileged groups are able to invoke their military status to legitimate their social status – the rights, positions, wealth, and power that they possess relative to, or at the expense of, their subordinated counterparts (Levy 1998).

This process will not proceed smoothly in a military in which ascriptive criteria such as race or ethnicity determine recruitment. Struggles which were centered around the access to "the right to fight," exposed ascriptive criteria but, to the extent that they were effective and led to the setting of new, more universalist criteria for recruitment, they also reinforced the universalist status of the military and hence its role in constructing social hierarchies. Rigid ascriptive criteria which are not revised towards more inclusionism deny the military its role as a source of inspiration and imitation for marginalized groups. That is why republicanism is tied more to democratic systems, in which hierarchies are built around relatively open access to the service, than to autocracies favoring the service of loyal groups. In an ascriptive structure, privileged status within the military and its convertibility into civilian status loses legitimacy, and hence impairs convertibility.

In general, militaries associated with nation building (involving ideas such as "melting pot" and "school of the nation" which highly value military service and its bearers) are those guided by inclusive policies of conscription (France, Germany, Israel) to a larger extent than militaries guided by exclusionary ones such as the U.S. (see Leander 2004). Conversely, the more that the ascriptive criteria prescribe exclusionism, the more the military is portrayed as a regime symbol (Enloe 1980). As such, resistance to the regime may promote resistance to the military, or embroilment of the military in domestic wars (see Carment, James & Taydas 2006, 219).

(2) Threat: Symbolic rewards may be tied to the level of external threats. Militarization contextualizes the level of threat and offers to remove that threat by force. State rulers can

thereby increase the demand for state protection, artificially or realistically, by exaggerating or simply leveraging external threats (Lake 1992). A perceived external threat increases the demand for troops (Posen 1984), which, in turn, spells out high MPR with the ramifications cited above. More important, the greater the perceived threat is to the nation's existence, the more worthy military sacrifice becomes. By extension, this may increase the status of sacrificers, who can be publically portrayed as contributing to the removal of this threat.

The level of social recognition ascribed to the military contribution determines the power that service members and their social networks hold, relative to that of groups excluded from the military or relegated to marginal, non- heroic roles. Social hierarchies constructed around the status of soldiering, as presented above, are based on the extent to which groups are recognized as sacrificing themselves for the elimination of existential threats. Furthermore, a socially constructed threat, if viewed as serious, increases the likelihood that groups will struggle for their place in the military, even for the long-term promotion of their citizenship status.

Existential threats, moreover, nurture patriotism by initiating commemorative projects. Commemoration is used to establish the value of military death and thereby, to encourage sacrifice (Ben-Ari 2005). At the same time, commemoration inscribes social hierarchies determined by politics, group affiliation and other criteria (see Gillis1996, 6-7; Johnston 2007, 138-160), and may thereby heighten military motivation by symbolically further rewarding the networks from which the fallen have originated, relative to other, less sacrificing groups.

(3) Republicanism: Militarization by means of manipulation or aggrandizing of external threats supports war mobilization (see Lake 1992). Yet, the scarcer the state's resources, including manpower, relative to its perceived threats, the more the state favors political arrangements – such as republicanism – for bargaining with the population to ensure mobilization (see Tilly 1992). This explains the positive relationship between the high profile of republicanism and the high rates of military participation in countries such as France, Germany (until WW II), and Israel, and the low levels in countries such as the U.S. and Britain where liberal discourse of citizenship is of paramount importance. Even in liberal societies such as the United States, however, republican rhetoric is used to motivate sacrifice (Krebs 2009). Republican discourse is also instrumental in countering liberal concerns about the negative

impact of mass recruitment on individual liberties (see Burk 2002). Republican discourse is thus deeply established as a rhetorical strategy for the mobilization of resources by presenting military contribution as convertible to social rewards.

A republican citizenship discourse supports convertibility rather than being supported by it. Republicanism is antecedent to the development of military service, as it is ingrained in political culture as much as it is reflected in multiple manifestations outside the military realm. Civic republicanism (for example, in the writing of Machiavelli 2001) is one example. After all, the level of republicanism varies even among societies that have enacted the same mode of conscription.

Furthermore, with a high MPR that often involves conscription, republicanism may set the cultural context within which claims are framed as a means of legitimization. Militarization paired with republicanism enlarges the circle of those who sacrifice, the social value of their sacrifice, and hence also the state's duty to them. In turn this process can be transformed into successful claim-making which further cements republicanism as a discourse that links duties with rights.

(4) Convergence: Militarization may confer exceptional worth on soldiering as an occupation, producing symbolic capital that increases occupational convergence and therefore also the conversion of military skills into civilian skills. Consequently, social structures are created in a manner that emulates military values. As financial and union pressures in the industrial era led to the increased standardization of workplace routines, the military model provided the best template for the organizational design of corporations (Clegg, Kornberger & Pitsis 2004, 13). Taylorism, for example, which formed the principles of scientific management, first appeared in 17th century military drills (Dandeker 1990, 70). Emulation may give preference to the placement of veterans in valuable civilian positions. In turn, such placement increases the degree of convergence between military and civilian hierarchies (Janowitz 1961; Moskos 1971). Part of this process may be advanced by veterans exporting some of the values with which they were socialized as soldiers into the civilian sphere (Krebs 2006, 6-16). Thus, in the longer term, military values and their human bearers (veterans) are privileged and therefore encourage the transferability of military-related skills into the civilian labor market.

(5) Identity-building: By increasing demand for troops and making the military attractive, militarization is instrumental in constituting the military as an important arena for the construction of ethnic, race, national, religious, or gender identities. This may derive from several origins, however two are most relevant to our study: (A) intergroup competitions culminating in identity-building, with either dominant or marginalized groups shaping a unique soldiering identity or negotiating their identity (Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari 2012). This may sometimes involve civilian elites playing a role in nurturing a distinct and unified identity to serve their own needs for control (Enloe 1980; Krebs 2006);and (B) socialization to fulfill specific roles, which is instrumental mainly in constructing masculine identities (Woodward, 2000). In addition to fighting for rights outside the military (Krebs 2006), identity can be used inside the armed forces to reshape military hierarchies, symbolically if not formally, by which groups claim superiority over other groups. Such is the case of *Mizrahi* and religious soldiers in the Israeli military (Kachtan 2012; Røislien 2012, respectively). Another example is the evangelization of the U.S. military, in which religion has replaced race as apparently a more legitimate social categorization by helping to create an identity of religious white soldiers separate from a general society viewed as weak and corrupt (Sharlet 2009). In both cases, moreover, soldiers can leverage their new identity to gain more prestige and honor in their civilian communities. Militarization contextualizes and values such identities.

In conclusion, variations in the level of convertibility mainly depend on the military participation ratio, the political construction of external threats, republicanism, the convergence between military and civilian organizations, occupations and hierarchies, and militarily-related identity building. These various factors are mutually reinforcing.

A high level of convertibility increases the production of symbolic rewards that may be converted, in part, into monetary rewards. Social rights accrued by ex-soldiers or their families are translated into pensions, healthcare, home loans, vocational training, and grants for education (Campbell 2004). Advantages in attaining certain jobs due to perceived high social capital is another form. Also important is the impact of military service on reinforcing the affinity between military identities and social roles and their emulation in workplaces. An example is the impact of the gay ban on disclosure decisions or stigmatization in civilian workplaces (Clair, Beatty, & MacLean, 2005).

Nonetheless, even when symbolic rewards are translated into monetary benefits, symbolic values have merit in and of themselves beyond the monetary value. An example is the case of the GI Bill. As Burk (2001) suggests, through the provision of welfare benefits, society recognizes and honors those who fulfill their military obligations. Likewise, as Mettler (2005) argues, the GI Bill treated veterans with dignity and respect, thereby enhancing their motivation to become active citizens by populating civic organizations promoting social change and protest.

Convertible symbolic rewards are therefore more significant than material rewards in motivating sacrifice. Historically, legitimizing war and war preparation relied on rewarding not only the recruits themselves, but also, and often primarily, the social groups that surrendered their children to military service and made sacrifices in other forms. Only the transition to vocational armies has shifted the exchange between the state and social groups to one of employer (the military) and employees (the recruits). It follows that a high level of convertibility is derived mainly from conscription, primarily with the combination of high MPR, republicanism-informed conversion of military contribution into rights, and the marginal role of direct material rewards.

Convertibility implies differences between officers and enlisted personnel. Officers have always enjoyed greater material rewards than enlistees, both to ensure the mobilization of professionals outside of the aristocracy, and loyalty to the political regime. On the symbolic level, officers gain more from their military service in terms of skills they acquire and their access to social and professional networks. On the other hand, as long as the Gordian knot that tied soldiering to citizenship was in force, the main benefit for enlistees was access to multiple rights. Accordingly, the analysis offered in this article is mainly applicable to enlisted personnel (including prospective enlistees and veterans) and their networks. After all, the main turning points in the history of the policies of military recruitment, from the citizen-soldier of the 1800s to the draft crisis of the 1970s, resulted from attitudes among the citizenry (and potential enlistees) rather than from those of the officers.

High rates of convertibility nurture and make militarization routine by laying the foundation for the state to extract the resources it needs (in this case, human resources) to prepare for, and wage, war. At the same time, high rates of convertibility help energize militarization by creating a large number of “stakeholders” who benefit from it. To be sure, militarization may

have other engines such as cultural attitudes towards violence, killing, and death. Likewise, the motivation to sacrifice wealth, and not just blood, matters as well. However, convertibility is a significant driving force, which can also actually reverse militarism, as the next section shows.

Declining Convertibility

One criterion for confirming a theory is that it generates empirically testable hypotheses. To this end, the propositions presented above can be validated by testing the conditions under which convertibility declines. On the surface, militarization is self-nurturing – producing rewards that nurture it in return. Thus, we have to trace the counter-factors that weaken the impact of militarization on social processes. Largely, the same variables that hitherto worked to sustain convertibility, as illustrated in Figure 1, now work in the opposite direction. I do not, however, offer a positivist measurement; what ultimately matters most is how social agents perceive their social gains relative to their level of military burden.

Historically, the following conditions emerged during the twilight era of the draft system, which began in the 1960s. They are less applicable to the era post-1990s when vocationalism supplanted conscription. The conditions are:

(1) Threat: Powerful groups may review the perceived level of threats, the methods for eliminating them, and the costs and sacrifice entailed in dealing with them. The mobilization of society by the state against perceived threats may be weighed against less lethal alternatives. Among the conditions yielding such sentiments are military failures and increases in the social and political costs entailed in the provision of security (casualties, ratio of soldiers per population, military expenditures). Increasing the costs raises the pressure to further monitor the state's performance in the military realm (see Lake 1992). Costly but unsuccessful wars always end with participants making collective claims about responsibility (Tilly 2008, 11). This may extend to the questioning of threats and the means undertaken to deal with them. In addition, cultural changes play a role. Major examples of such changes were the increased reluctance to sacrifice in war following the rise of individualism and the predominance of a market society (Smith 2005, 500-501) and the transition from materialist to post-materialist political culture (Inglehart 2000). Cultural tendencies of this kind may result from declining threats as much as they encourage a critical reading of threats; certainly, they are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, when the perception of threat declines,

especially as the state fails to artificially exaggerate them, the state's capacity to mobilize for war is challenged and the pursuit of more peaceful policies is encouraged. Militarization is reversed, turning to demilitarization.

Declining threat and demilitarization breed declining convertibility by two means. First, service members garner less prestige, potentially translated into fewer benefits, especially with newer, less combative missions such as peacekeeping (Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder 2011). Second, declining threat makes the sacrifice and commitment of troops less justifiable (Smith 2005, 494). Assuming that a greater (perceived) threat to a nation's existence correlates with greater appreciation of military service resulting in larger rewards to those willing to make the sacrifice, a waning threat will have the opposite effect. It is not for nothing that justification of military death in the era of non-existential wars became a greater challenge (see Ben-Ari 2005). A failure to justify may attract criticism, thereby devaluing the sacrifice of the fallen and their families (see, for example Franklin & Lyons 2008).

(2) MPR: Selective recruitment policies, typical of peacetime armies, along with a greater reliance on technology, may reduce convertibility. It is worth noting that while the peacetime transition from mass to selective conscription was guided by economic and strategic rationales, it in turn affected convertibility by affecting the status of the military and its recruits.

Selectivity leads to declining convertibility of professional skills thanks to the increased competition in the labor market between veterans and skilled nonveterans. Labor competition is typical of a selective system that enables nonveterans to acquire education and work experience and thus gain advantage over veterans. Military service causes an earning reduction regardless of the mode of recruitment because military experience provides only a partial substitute for the civilian labor market experience lost while in service. This impact is less conspicuous, however, in mandatory service when highly-educated groups serve and later compete with those found unfit to serve because of educational or physical reasons. The impact is more significant when veterans compete with nonveterans of a similar status in terms of income and education, and even lose advantage relative to those originating from disadvantaged groups (see Angrist 1990; Angrist & Krueger 1994; Card & Cardoso 2011).

As competition affects convertibility, it may encourage the more educated to shorten or evade their military service as much as possible, instead choosing more economically and professionally promising options outside of the military. For this group of potential high-level employees, the negative earnings premium is higher (Card & Cardoso 2011), while the military is more beneficial for more disadvantaged enlistees (Hisnanick 2003; MacLean, & Parsons 2010). Selectivity increases the bargaining power of recruits vis-à-vis the military, especially of powerful ones. Decreased MPR corroborates the decline of republicanism.

(3) Republicanism: Republicanism declined with the expansion of the franchise and the creation of welfare programs to reduce social inequality following the world wars, which eroded the idea that citizens have an unlimited obligation to bear arms in the defense of their countries (Burk 2002, 18-19). Citizenship has since been increasingly viewed as a status one is born with and not something one has to pay for by serving in the military (Leander 2004, 579). As Moskos (2001) complained, "the substantial federal aid given to college students … created a G.I. Bill without the G.I." The result was the erosion of the citizen-soldier as a social role (Silver 1994; Turner 2001). This process reinforces the liberal citizenship discourse (provided that different discourses are produced simultaneously).

Furthermore, reinforcement of liberalization may also stem from another process: to the extent that the MPR is reduced, there is no longer an overlap between military service and belonging to the nation, and the link between service and citizenship is severed. Rather than being an unquestioned duty, selective conscription makes military service less equitable, and as such, less legitimate, generating debates about its fairness (Levi 1997) and the very obligation to serve (Burk 2002). Contesting this obligation reinforces the liberal citizenship discourse, premised on rights rather than obligations. Liberal discourse undercuts veterans' claims for rewards in return for their sacrifice.

Yet, liberalization of the citizenship discourse can run its course autonomously, exogenous to the realm of social-military relations. The mobilization rhetoric of WW II, and the Cold War rhetoric proclaiming America to be the defender of individual rights (Krebs 2009, 158), in addition to intergenerational differences in Western Europe regarding priorities given to physical security (Inglehart 2000) are cases in point.

As soon as groups attain an autonomous status that is no longer conditional on military sacrifice, they lose much of their interest in serving in the military. At the same time, this rule has an opposite impact on those who serve but lose some of their benefits relative to those who do not serve. Even allocation of rights to marginalized groups can lose impact, if rights, such as those generated by feminist or civil rights struggles, are not linked to military duties. This may further affect convertibility, as military service loses its role as a significant source for convertible rewards.

With the drop in the MPR, the decline of republicanism has stronger impacts. First, under the draft system, selectivity creates a critical problem whereby the more deferrals or exemptions from service that people receive, the less the state can legitimately privilege service members without discriminating against those who do not serve. Hence, the convertible resources of service members and veterans shrink.

Second, reduced MPR weakens republicanism by limiting the collective bargaining power in military affairs of those who are serving, and of their social networks. The "voice" option is favored over the "exit" option when those involved have limited alternatives (Hirschman 1970). Thus, because conscription relies on coercion, "voice" in the form of collective action is favored over "exit" in the form of emigration or defection. In contrast, the more deferments and exemptions are possible, the more "exit" in the form of "opting out" will be the favored option. Ultimately, the bargaining power of those who are serving and their social networks is weakened (Levy 2012, 120-126; Silver 2004).

Apart from the impact of declining MPR, another mechanism that erodes republicanism is the increasing incongruence between military sacrifice and widespread post-materialist values and trends toward globalization in Western societies. The concomitant ascendancy of a market society, with its emphasis on individualistic, market-based values over national ones, has made military sacrifice increasingly more difficult to sell (Smith 2005). When sacrifice is less valued and the state’s power declines, republicanism declines as well.

In short, the republican criteria for the distribution of social goods and the justification of social dominance have declined, and by extension, have eroded convertibility.

(4) Convergence: Convergence between the military and the civilian realm is reduced. A major hallmark of a market society is the growing divergence between military and civilian organizations, with the latter shifting toward knowledge-based rather than resource- and skill-based organizations. Military organizations are increasingly expected to borrow from civilian values, rather than bringing military values to civilian management practices (Fukuyama & Shulsky 1997). In turn, divergence prompts the military to seek more convergence. Western armies have progressively been adopting post-Fordist patterns derived from the commercial and industrial sectors: downsizing, specializing, outsourcing logistical missions that lie beyond the military's "core business", centralizing the command into unified, joint headquarters while at the same time flattening the hierarchy, and moving toward network warfare (King 2006). In such a climate, service members lose some of their ability to convert their military contribution into valuable benefits and professional assets in the labor market after being discharged. They offer imitation, instead of original knowledge.

Although ex-soldiers, particularly officers and members of special forces, use their credentials to obtain highly-paid employment in private military companies (Leander 2009), this has a marginal impact relative to the occupational divergence between combatant jobs – the core military profession – and highly-paid jobs in industrial countries, especially in the information industry. Furthermore, professionalization of the military, typified by the transition to capital-intensive forces, further limits the number of those potentially benefitted from transferability of skills. The military, more than ever, draws on fewer, but relatively higher educated soldiers to use the increasingly sophisticated weaponry, thus reducing the benefits disadvantaged groups obtain from military service (Kentor, Jorgenson & Kick 2012).

One may claim, however, that the U.S. military, for example, was in the forefront of attempts by civilian organizations to promote racial integration. So extensive were these efforts that Moskos and Butler (1996) suggested that civilian organizations adopt the military programs, given the similarities between military and civilian organizations. Nonetheless, while this idea may apply to early modern organizations which represented a high level of convergence, it does not apply to late/post-modern ones (Cheng 1999). In practice, since the 1990s, the military has sought to implement the best practices of private and public companies and organizations in achieving workforce diversity (Buchana 1996; Reyes 2006). Again, the military emulates more than it innovates. Furthermore, even if the military nurtures managerial practices, such as cultivating leadership methods and creating alluring recruiting

techniques and competitive strategies that, arguably, can be readily applied to any industry (Carrison &and Walsh 2004), it does not mean that that civilian industries are in a hurry to actually do so.

Professional convertibility declines following military failures as well. This can be seen when the diminished prestige of the military fighting an unpopular war is reflected in attitudes toward ex-service members in the civilian labor market. For example, unemployment rates among American veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are higher compared to nonveterans. A possible explanation is that employers are reluctant to hire veterans of these wars because of their image as overly violent (Kleykamp, MacLean and Hughes 2010).

Reduced military prestige not only drives a decline in convertibility, but is also driven by it. As military service begins to be viewed as having less social worth or being more costly, groups who paid a greater price are inclined to be more critical of the military's performance. Military costs and the political monitoring of the armed forces are strongly linked (Lake 1992). Military defeats are thus politically constructed rather than being objective entities.

(5) Identity-building: Manpower shortfall that selectivity creates is an important driving force behind the application of inclusive policies to minorities and women. Political processes taking place outside the military are also instrumental in promoting inclusive policies and involve intergroup struggles over the identity and values of the political community. In such struggles, minorities, women and homosexuals attempt to tie their military service to citizenship and other social rights, and in turn these struggles shape collective identity (Krebs 2006).

The military may therefore remain a suitable site for identity formation, but mainly for lower-class groups. Cultural diversity displaces social representativeness with lower groups turning the armed forces into a symbolic battleground of choice with a view to achieving complete equality in society (Boene 2003). In such cases, the entrance of the new group may be viewed by the dominant group as a threat, undermining the cultural identity of the military and thereby impairing the group's convertible resources, since they are now serving in a less-valued (less masculine, less "white", etc.) military.

In sum, convertibility declines as the variables which hitherto functioned to increase convertibility now work in the opposite direction. Militarization can be a self-nurturing

process until counter-factors, produced outside the existing loop, come into effect. In this case, cultural processes and the ascent of a market society work to devalue convertibility. In turn, declining convertibility increases the propensity towards demilitarization.

To be sure, the processes described here, which engendered divergence, liberalization and other effects have already autonomously diminished militarization. However, the impact of these processes on reducing convertibility further affects the altering of the self-fulfilling loop of militarization. Consequently, preparation for war is regarded as less desired, and the social practices that sustained convertibility are less effective. Sequentially, demilitarization further undermines those social practices that enabled convertibility. Other factors that nurture militarization, such as culture, may mitigate the impact of attenuating convertibility. However, as the power of the state to mobilize decreases with declining convertibility, it is less likely that militarization will remain at the same level.

To compensate for this shortfall in the value of symbolic rewards, the state may increase the use of monetary rewards, leading to the vocationalization of western militaries. In general, with the rise in standard of living, which brought about more reservations towards a military lifestyle, as identified by Janowitz (1972), expectations for increased compensation for sacrifice rose as well. In turn, this transition from institution to occupation eroded the normative values of military service, supplanting values such as duty, honor, and serving the country, by monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards (Moskos 1977). Yet, as the discussion about reducing MPR suggests, vocationalization was not only a result of attenuated convertibility, but also a cause of heightened attenuation.

States have used vocationalization, in addition to other means, in order to deal with their decreasing ability to mobilize society. Since the 1960s, state actions have become increasingly subject to negotiations with the citizenry with regard to military affairs, which has had a restrictive and constraining effect on state policies. In turn, such limitations have encouraged state agencies to bypass, rather than mobilize, society to war, by inter alia, increasing reliance on vocational forces, contracting-out and technologization (Vennesson 2011). In other words, mobilization is decoupled from restoring convertibility. Such restoration is less viable inasmuch as high levels of convertibility were largely predicated on the upper middle-class' historical partnership with the state in organizing society on military

principles. Thus, the most important tenets of convertibility – MPR, republicanism and convergence – are less likely to return to their previous levels.

Conclusions

This article has examined the state formation school-derived republican exchange as a point of departure, from which a simple insight has emerged: states use symbolic rewards to mobilize society for war. However, this school does not explain variations in the levels of rewards. Focusing on the reward states utilized to fill the ranks, this article has proposed to further develop the concept of convertibility. In this way, the article has honed tools through which we can explain factors that affect the level of rewards.

Convertibility allows us to identify the structure that values or devalues the gains produced by military sacrifice. Even if we deal only with the allocation of rights – the focus of state formation literature – the discussion about convertibility can help us analyze the conditions that devalue the existing rights of several groups, such as the expansion of the welfare state. This conceptualization, therefore, helps bridge a gap identified in the existing literature.

Convertibility can be measured using the variables identified in Figure 1. Monitoring perceptions of threats and service members' prestige, evaluating the relative salaries earned by veterans versus nonveterans, and examining gaps in access to social rights, represent only a few ways of measuring convertibility. Furthermore, theorizing convertibility has been further reinforced by generating empirically testable hypotheses, that is, by specifying the conditions under which the same variables that worked to uphold convertibility can work to produce the opposite result.

As mentioned, the goal has been to develop a theory. Therefore, the proposition offered here, mainly the variables of convertibility, can be seen as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry. In this spirit, though I have not offered a positivist measurement of convertibility, the variables presented here can be further developed to allow a quantitative measurement, such as the linkage between the level of perceived threat and the motivation to serve. However, since my study focused chiefly on the transition from conscription to vocational militaries, the main contribution is a better understanding of this historical process.

Two venues for future study may be suggested. First, convertibility provides tools to better understand the willingness to sacrifice. Note that this article was premised on the notion of the republican exchange, according to which the state rewards for sacrifice. Yet, the extent to which the level of rewards determines the level of sacrifice deserves further inquiry in order to substantiate the linkage between the two. Study of the attenuated willingness to sacrifice in Israeli society argues for a linkage of this sort (Levy 2012). The question as to why different groups agree to sacrifice leads us to distinguish between sacrifice at the social group level, where the group yields its sons and daughters to the military, and the individual level, where soldiers themselves first enlist into high-risk positions and then risk their lives in combat. Convertible rewards can be effective in motivating the social group, but the transition from the group level to the unit/individual level deserves further analysis, as more variables are brought into play.

Second, this article offers the interplay between burden and rewards. Social hierarchies are built around the scale of military contribution, and, ironically, it is this inequality in burden-sharing that compensates those who shoulder the majority of military burden. An unequal burden is translated into a privileged social position, thereby providing compensation for sacrifice. Consent to military service can thus be maintained despite unequal sharing of the military burden, on which Margaret Levi (1997) focused in her theory of *Contingent Consent*. Consent may also be contingent on reward-sharing, and not only burden-sharing. Focus on reward-sharing thus helps identify the mechanisms that create a sense of fairness. True, perceptions about both the fairness of inequitable burdens and rewards are subjective, but rewards add a more tangible sense of fairness. At the same time, when a burden is not compensated for, it is less legitimized. As a result, included groups may be more open to, and even demand, integration of previously excluded groups. This study can thus be seen as a call for more scholarly attention to the notion of convertibility, and for empirical testing of the power of this concept.

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