



סדרת מאמרים לדיון Working paper series

No. 24 – 2013

The Death Hierarchy: Western States and the Changing Sacrifices of Citizens and Soldiers

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Abstract

States expose their citizens, soldiers and enemy civilians to different levels of risk, as studies in this area have shown. Missing from the literature, however, has been an integrative analysis demonstrating how these exposures can be positioned on a unified hierarchy of risk, and how this hierarchy can be shaped and reshaped, thereby reflecting the extent to which the state values the lives of its soldiers, compared to its civilians and enemy noncombatants. It is argued that the hierarchy is shaped through the interplay between two sets of legitimacies – legitimacy to sacrifice and legitimacy to use force. This interplay yields five main variations of placement on the death hierarchy: risking more privileged soldiers, risking lower-class soldiers, favoring soldiers over citizens, targeting enemy noncombatants, and re-risking soldiers.

Keywords: casualty sensitivity, death hierarchy, force-protection, risk-aversion

Introduction

States expose their citizens, soldiers and enemy civilians to different levels of risk, as can be inferred from the following situations: (1) given that the draft touches more of the upper middle class than a volunteer force (Vasquez, 2005), it follows that in a volunteer force, less-privileged groups are put at a higher risk; (2) given that class, gender and ethnic origins affect manpower policies (Krebs, 2006), different groups are differentially exposed to potential risk; (3) given that the shift from a labor-intensive doctrine to a capital-intensive one substitutes firepower for labor to avoid casualties (Caverley, 2009–2010), it follows that enemy noncombatants may be placed at greater risk in urban wars (Shaw, 2002; Smith, 2008); (4) given that casualty sensitivity affects troop deployment (Horowitz & Levendusky, 2011;

Vasquez, 2005), and given that military missions are aimed at minimizing the risk posed to civilians (Edmunds, 2012), it follows that when casualty aversion restricts deployment, soldiers are prioritized over the security interests of civilians.

Two scholarly deficits are, however, identified in the literature. First, is the lack of an integrative analysis demonstrating how these exposures can be positioned on a unified hierarchy of risk. In other words, by positioning one group under a specific risk, the state also positions other groups in a higher or lower level of risk. Hierarchies of risk to the protectors versus the protected, and to targeted civilians, are thus created.

Second, once the hierarchy is depicted, it is necessary to explain how it is shaped and reshaped. The abundant literature about casualty-sensitivity and the derived casualty-aversion explains modifications in the level of legitimacy for sacrifice. Yet, an analysis is lacking of how variations in this legitimacy are translated into the use of force, which differentially impacts the groups positioned on the risk hierarchy. For example, casualty-shyness may generate risk-aversion, which reduces the level of protection provided to citizens, but generates force-protection as well, which may shift the risk from soldiers to enemy noncombatants. Hence, we should factor in legitimacy to use force in its encounter with legitimacy to sacrifice.

It is argued that states shape and reshape the 'death hierarchy,' which is the extent to which the state values the lives of its soldiers, compared to its civilians and enemy noncombatants. The hierarchy is shaped through the interplay between two sets of legitimacies: the legitimacy to sacrifice, and the legitimacy to use force. This interplay yields five main variations of placement on the death hierarchy: risking more privileged soldiers, risking lower-class soldiers, favoring soldiers over citizens, targeting enemy noncombatants, and re-risking soldiers.

This paper is aimed at dealing with the implication of this hierarchy on military policies, by drawing on the cases of the U.S., Britain and Israel, as three democracies involved in lengthy warfare. The next section presents the theoretical arguments, offering the determinants of the death hierarchy. It is followed by an analysis of five main variations in the shaping of the hierarchy.

Determinants of the Death Hierarchy

The death hierarchy is demarcated by the interplay between two sets of legitimacies: the legitimacy of sacrifice and the legitimacy of using force.

Legitimacy to use force relates to the use of force in general, and to the use of force targeting enemy civilians, in particular. To operationalize the profile of this legitimacy, we must consider six factors: (1) the level of external threat, affected by the assessed impact of that threat on national interests – existential, material, or symbolic – and the perceived availability of nonlethal options to eliminate it. Dehumanization of the enemy may help legitimize lethality (Malesevic, 2010, 141-144); (2) the domestic political structure and its reflection in public opinion, elite opinion, and political actions that help shape and constrain foreign policy-making (Aldrich et al., 2006); (3) the moral justification for protecting the state's soldiers by using overwhelming force against others (see Larson & Savych, 2006, 169-170); (4) the state's level of commitment to a hostile population (Ron, 2003), from which also derives, in part, the maneuvering power of that population vis-à-vis the state and the space of resistance; (5) the military's social composition and armament. Social composition is reflected in the soldiers' political stances, which may affect their attitudes toward politically-loaded military missions (Levy, 2008). Mode of armament determines the level of detachment of the combatant from its victim, and hence helps bypass the almost universal aversion to close-encounter killings (Malesevic, 2010, 227-229); (6) the impact of global restraints, including international laws, that protect civilians from intentional attack unless, and for such a time as, they take direct part in hostilities, (as directed in *Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977*, Watkin, 2004, 16).

As the use of force is aimed at eliminating a threat, its mode and intensity can be modified, as militaries learn from past experiences and implement the lessons learned, as much as domestic conditions (mostly listed above) allow (Levy, 1994).

Legitimacy to sacrifice is positively affected by the variables offered by students of casualty sensitivity, as follows: (1) societal tolerance for sacrifice in general (Smith, 2005), in particular the extent to which citizens tolerate war dangers, differentiated by the group's attitude to sacrifice and its bargaining power with the state over the risk to which it exposes the group; (2) the extent to which the war is portrayed as successfully attaining its original

goals (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2009); (3) the definition of the war's goals in relation to the level of perceived external threat (Jentleson & Britton, 1998); (4) the public's acceptance of the "rightness" of the war (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2009); (6) low casualties log (Mueller, 2005); (5) the level of consensus among the elite, which affects the public response to casualties (Larson, 1996, 75–97); (6) the social profile of the military: the proportion of representatives of privileged groups in the army can be positively correlated with the acceptance of sacrifice (Moskos, 2001) or, conversely, increased reliance on the service of less privileged positively affects tolerance for sacrifice, as the willingness to sacrifice is higher among less privileged (Levy, 2012). Furthermore, death of lower groups gives rise to apathy toward sacrifice because those groups possess fewer of the resources needed to engage in politics (Kriner & Shen, 2010; Vasquez, 2005). Either way, the state may actively preserve or alter the social composition by using rewarding tools to feed the military with trustworthy manpower.

As figure 1 shows, the interplay between the two sets of legitimacies produces different positions on the death hierarchy and yields five main variations.

Figure 1: Determinants of the Death Hierarchy

Profile of legitimacy to sacrifice	High	A1 Risking privileged soldiers more than other soldiers and civilians in defensive campaigns	B1 Risking privileged soldiers more than other soldiers and civilians in offensive campaigns
		A2 Risking lower-class soldiers more than privileged soldiers and civilians in defensive campaigns	B2 Risking lower-class soldiers more than privileged soldiers and civilians in offensive campaigns
Low		C Favoring soldiers over own civilians, or pursuit of non-violent solutions	D Targeting enemy noncombatants
		Low	High
		Profile of legitimacy to use force	

Variations in the Death Hierarchy

1. Risking More Privileged Soldiers

Republicanism governed the era of state formation (from the 18th century) accompanied by the formation of mass citizen's armies. Under these circumstances, the state risked the lives of soldiers drawn from privileged groups; first and foremost the rising middle-class, more often than enlistees from lower classes.

Two factors created this structure: First, state elites trusted the privileged more than others. Enloe (1980) held that ethnicity is employed as a criterion for estimating the degree of loyalty of different groups to the state, from which derived the 'ethnic state security map', determining the group's access to valuable positions and vital functions in the military. Ethnicity is a ready-made criterion because it is more discernible, but the notion of 'state security map' and the hierarchy of trust it creates is applicable to other classifications as well, in order to understand why lower groups were less trusted. As Krebs (2006) recognized, manpower policies are highly affected by the degree of trust state rulers place on various social groups. Consequently, social stratifications impeded the changes required for bringing military strength to its maximum, as this involved arming the lower classes, who were oppressed and full of hatred against the government (Andreski, 1954, 37). Multiple forms of exclusionary policies were thus the result.

Second, military hierarchies, in conjunction with republican criteria, yield social hierarchies constructed around the status of soldiering, with initial marginalizing effects on women, ethnic minorities, and other groups. Unequal burden was translated into, and thereby compensated for, by privileged social position. Examples of hierarchy-making are the male-dominated system of war that influences inter-gender power relations in society (Goldstein, 2001) or the role of citizenship discourse surrounding the French *Levée en Masse* of 1793 in promoting the social mobility of the middle class (Forrest, 2003).

As long as privileged groups benefitted from exclusionary manpower policies, exclusionary policies became entrenched. Over time, however, this structure has energized struggles over "the right to fight." Attempted entry by a new, previously-excluded group risks being resisted by the more established groups, even though the new group may actually increase burden-sharing. For example, male-dominated organizations have tried to curtail women's integration

into Western militaries during the twilight zone between conscription and vocationalization. Another example is the objection to equal integration of African-Americans into the conscript U.S. military. On the surface, dominant groups work against their own interests. But if we factor in the rewards the group produces from its service and its fear that integration of newcomers may devalue such rewards, we can infer that concerns about rewards tip the scale relative to the expected value of decreased burden.

Risking privileged groups more than others is depicted in Cells A1 and B1 in figure 1. Republicanism, with the social hierarchies it created, encouraged sacrifice, thus increasing the legitimacy for sacrifice. When this matched a high level of legitimacy to use force, offensive approach (B1) governed military policies, as was the case in the U.S. and some other liberal democracies during the first years of the Cold War, and in Israel until the First Lebanon War (1982). Declining legitimacy to use force encouraged a defensive approach (A1); which held that the use of force should be reserved for military disputes that threaten national security and for which society is willing to sacrifice. This was the case in Australia, in which conscription was accepted after World War II for defensive goals and not for overseas missions (Vasquez, 2009, 335-372).

2. Risking Lower-Class Soldiers

Legitimacy to sacrifice has declined in industrialized democracies since World War II and more profoundly since the 1960s-70s, affecting primarily the middle class. Several factors contributed to this trend: (1) The cost of security rose as the Cold War drew to a close during the 1970s. Although not necessarily in absolute terms, these costs grew in relative terms insofar as economic and physical security continued to be valued positively, but their relative priority declined over time (Inglehart, 1990). (2) The rise of individualism came at the expense of dedication to serving one's country, and actually contradicted the very values of military service such as sacrifice and discipline (see Smith, 2005). (3) Citizenship was gradually divorced from soldiering, once the middle class was able to realize considerable achievements independent of military service (Burk, 1995; Moskos, 2001). In addition, due to technological developments, along with the increasing reliance on specialized, small military forces for new unconventional threats, military service was eroded as a route to active citizenship for the middle class (Turner, 2001). Decoupling citizenship from soldiering devalued the latter.

The declining legitimacy to sacrifice delegitimized the conscription-based system, and highlighted casualty sensitivity (Ajangiz, 2002; Everts, 2002). To counter this trend, states could offer compensation in the form of rights allocation. However, since the legitimacy crisis surrounding the draft and the ethos of casualty sensitivity involved mainly middle-class groups who already enjoyed considerable access to political and social rights, the state had almost nothing to offer them in this regard.

Still, in an attempt to attract the middle class, the state could legitimize sacrifice by increasing monetary rewards directly allocated to servicepersons, a move that has typified the vocationalization experienced by Western armies since the 1970s, and the gradual phasing-out of the republican-type draft (Moskos, 1977). Eventually, vocationalization of the armed forces encouraged the enlistment of the lower classes, for whom the monetary incentives offered by the military matched their expectations more than those of middle-class groups, and for whom the military was a significant avenue for attainment of first-class citizenship. Realignment of the social composition of Western militaries resulted in the inclusion of lower socio-economic groups, including immigrants, which gradually led to the abolition of the draft in most industrialized democracies. With the devaluation of military service, dominant groups were more motivated to accept exclusionary policies.

Social realignment shifted the risk from the middle-class to lower-class groups. Two combined factors were at work: First, increasing presence of lower groups. Second, casualty sensitivity may become lower as long as less privileged groups are put under a higher risk. As Vasquez (2005) argued, democracies that depend on conscription are more likely to generate anticasualty collective action than are democracies that rely largely on volunteer forces, because conscription touches more powerful actors more directly than does voluntary service.

In the U.S., following World War II, the presence of African-Americans in the armed forces increased, at the same time as motivation to serve among the white middle-class was lessened. In the Vietnam War, to which many African-Americans were channeled voluntarily, or because of fewer options for deferments, the death rate for African-Americans was roughly 30 percent higher than the average death rate for the U.S. forces fighting in Southeast Asia (Westheider, 1997, 13). In the early years of the AVF, African-American men from disadvantaged families were nearly four times as likely as white men from advantaged families to enter the military and to serve in combat occupations (MacLean & Parsons. 2010).

The increasing military participation of those and other members of lower classes revealed that, for example, in communities that suffered the highest casualty rates in the war in Iraq, the proportion of college-educated individuals was almost 40% lower than in those communities that did not suffer casualties in this war. In contrast, during the Vietnam War, the gap stood at 25%. Similarly, the family-income gap between the communities rose from \$8,200 in Vietnam to \$13,200 in Iraq (Kriner & Shen, 2010, 29-31).

In Israel, despite adherence to a draft system, an increase in casualties was noted among members of the lower-classes, ethnic minorities, immigrants, and religious groups, beginning in the 1980s. Concurrently, declining motivation for combat sacrifice was occurring among the secular middle class, on which the military had traditionally drawn. Empirically, comparison between the first week of the First Lebanon War (1982), after which motivation for sacrifice declined, and the 2000-2005 Al-Aqsa intifada, as a lethal conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, shows a clear drop in the proportion of casualties from secular middle-class groups, from about 68.5% to about 45.5%, and more than 25% relative to the change in the demographic weight of these groups (Levy, 2012, 83-84).

Increasing the shielding of the privileged groups was also reflected in decisions to refrain from deploying reserve soldiers. Naturally, reservists are higher on the social ladder than active-duty soldiers, and as such, casualties among them may have ignited protest. Against this background, President Lyndon Johnson refused to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves during the Vietnam War (Vasquez, 2009, 102-105). Similarly, growing casualty sensitivity drove Israeli commanders to reduce the deployment of reserve soldiers in danger theatres (Levy, 2012). Vocationalization of the armed forces shifted this trend and encouraged deployment of reserve forces. Their use became more necessary with the diminishing of active duty forces. The transition to a voluntary force facilitated the call up of those willing to serve, as was the case in Britain, which made reserve forces more useable and relevant to post-Cold War operations (Dandeker et al, 2011).

In addition to social realignment that reduces the risk to the more privileged, in order to better protect the soldiers, militaries adopt a capital- and technology-intensive military doctrine at the expense of labor-intensive strategies, trading human risk for capital (Caverley, 2009-2010).

The death hierarchy is then modified, and the state may favor the lives of soldiers drawn from privileged groups over those drawn from less-privileged classes. Cells A2/B2 capture this situation. Legitimacy for sacrifice generally declines but is largely balanced by the willingness to sacrifice among less-advantaged groups. America is typified by a more offensive posture, owing to the Cold War-informed high legitimacy to use force (B2) while West European countries have adopted a more defensive doctrine (A2).

3. Favoring Soldiers over Citizens

Despite social realignment, casualty sensitivity may rise, and thus the state may reshape the death hierarchy so that it favors the lives of its soldiers over those of its citizens (Cell C on Figure 1). Casualty-adverse policies are then the policy outcome. By and large, casualty aversion means that the state upgrades the value of soldiers' lives, thereby reducing the level of protection it offers.

This reshaping of the death hierarchy may be caused by **one or more of the following** conditions: First, autonomous cultural trends may be at work, such as those that already have negatively affected tolerance for sacrifice, as listed by Smith (2005). Second, it takes time for the impact of social realignment to mature, as this entails a structural reform in manpower policies and armament. Therefore, reshaping the death hierarchy towards favoring soldiers over civilians may even precede the stage where the state risks soldiers from lower-class groups more than privileged ones. Providing less security may even be a short-term solution until the structural change matures.

Third, casualty sensitivity may extend to lower-class groups as well. Such sensitivity can emerge from the groups' feeling that they have "passed the test" of proving their ability, or from a sense of receiving unfair benefits from their military sacrifice, as typified the engagement of African-American veterans of World War II in the civil rights movement during the Vietnam War (Cowen, 2008, 201-202). Sensitivity may also be derived from criticism of the government's military performance, thereby raising the threshold for using force (as was the case of the religious sector's protest following the Second Lebanon War in Israel, Levy, 2012, 99-101). Fourth, reliance on groups representing the lower-classes may be insufficient, and may necessitate the need to once again risk privileged groups for large-scale military operations (such as reserve forces).

Fifth, policymakers tend to ignore the impact of realignments. They believe that the public will not tolerate a high toll of combat casualties, and such concerns thereby constrain military deployment (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009). Members of the elite appear to be more casualty-sensitive than the people they serve (Record, 2000). They may be influenced by past experiences ("Vietnam Syndrome" or "Lebanon Syndrome") without waiting to test the real impact of the variables affecting legitimacy for sacrifice as detailed here. In sum, these conditions signify a lowering profile of legitimacy for sacrifice.

Protecting the lives of soldiers over citizens can be achieved by the shift towards a capital-intensive military doctrine. Yet, such a doctrine is poorly suited for combating insurgencies that typify modern small wars, so the likelihood of winning the war decreases (Caverley, 2009–2010).

More specifically, force-protection trumped mission accomplishment in the execution of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, and more profoundly, in Iraq, mainly guided by casualty-sensitivity ingrained in members of the elite.

Two practices which were used are relevant: armorizing, (equipping personnel or equipment with armor or other protective devices), and FOBs (forward operating bases). Both protect soldiers, but also have the effect of separating soldiers from the populace that they are supposed to be engaging and protecting. Most important is the psychological impact: soldiers were distracted from paying attention to the people they had been designated to protect, and were instead focused on minimally completing the mission and returning safely to the FOB. Commanders were also isolated and thereby became increasingly divorced from reality (Synnott, 2008, 66). Similarly, physical separation was also significant, in that it prevented the continual presence necessary to gain the trust of the populace, and also limited the troop's mobility. Furthermore, commanders were required to dress their troops in thirty pounds of body armor, reducing their speed, and troops were prohibited from conducting patrols with fewer than eight Americans, thus also reducing their stealth (Moyar, 2009, 242). Yet, the legitimacy to use force was at a mid-low degree, as long as the troops controlled a population for the benefit of re-state making, rather than repression.

These practices limited the prospects for strategic success, since protecting and gaining the trust of the population is the main strategy of a successful state-building stability mission

(Gibson, 2009). As Lyall and Wilson (2009) already identified, the increasing mechanization of Western militaries since World War I has decreased the interaction of military units with local populations, curtailing the military's ability to collect local information and win the population's trust, thereby affecting the military's ability to defeat weaker insurgent organizations.

Risk-aversion by means of force-protection can be elevated to mission-aversion; the avoidance of risky missions at the cost of not achieving the goals of the war. Such criticism was leveled against the Israeli military after the Second Lebanon War. In July 2006, Israel launched a full-scale war against Lebanon in response to the abduction of two soldiers by Hezbollah militiamen on the border between Israel and Lebanon. Initially, concern about casualties led the government to rule out a ground operation, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed the air force. Aerial assaults, however, failed to stop Hezbollah from launching rockets and injuring civilians in Israel's northern towns. Nevertheless, favoring soldiers' lives over the lives of citizens contributed to the hesitation to approve a ground operation inside Lebanon, which would have been effective at clearing out the launchers. As the committee appointed by the government to inquire into this failure concluded:

The IDF conducted itself during the war as if its concern about casualties among its soldiers was a central element in its planning process and operational considerations. . . .

We note that a fundamental component of Israel's security approach is that the army's role is to protect civilians and ensure they live their routine lives (Winograd Committee, 2008, 252).

A similar scenario repeated itself two years later. In June 2008, the Israeli government decided not to launch a widespread military operation in Gaza, despite escalation by Hamas in the firing of Qassam rockets that targeted the Israeli civilian population. As an alternative, it chose to accept an Egyptian-mediated truce between Israel and the Hamas government that controlled Gaza. Concern about casualties among soldiers, including reserve soldiers, played a major role (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008).

Collective action aggravated sensitivity. Most significant was the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The Four Mothers movement inspired a cost-centered discourse, which focused on what was seen as worthless sacrifice for pointless deployment in Lebanon, and maintained that the soldiers serving along the border deserved no less security than did the

civilians they were deployed to protect (Sela, 2007). Later, the Second Lebanon War of 2006 reflected this sensitivity, as much as aggravated it, with the cost-centered bereavement discourse that emerged from the war, inspired by what has been viewed as pointless sacrifice for a flawed war (Levy, 2012, 106-107). The threshold was therefore raised for launching a costly ground operation on Gazan soil.

In these cases, then, protecting soldiers prevailed over accomplishing the missions that were of high concern to the national interests of these three countries, signifying the inverse of the Hobbesian norm governing the state.

Intervention in Afghanistan aimed to build stability in order to minimize the risk that the country would host international terrorism, while intervention in Iraq was premised first on containing the risks associated with acquisition of WMD, and later on, re-stabilizing the regime following the invasion (Edmunds, 2012, 267). In the United States, military missions are designed to protect the security of its citizens, as well as the American way of life and values, even through wars fought abroad (Caniglia, 2001, 79-80). From the American and British perspectives, compromising the mission in order to protect soldiers means providing less protection to the country. In a different manner, part of the Israeli military's mission is to protect specific regional communities, generally those located near the borders, from immediate physical threats such as terror attacks and rocket shelling, which makes the meaning of the new hierarchy more tangible.

In sum, military missions designed to protect national security become subject to limitations imposed by the primary need to protect the soldiers. The soldier's right to life weakens the belief, that in joining the armed forces, soldiers take on a contract of unlimited liability (McCartney, 2010, 418–419).

When specific communities are at risk, the state may even discriminate between them, as is the case in Israel. Communities with a lower socioeconomic standing are located along the borders, next to Lebanon in the north and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip in the south, while higher socioeconomic communities reside closer to the central areas of the country (Levy, 2012, 132-144). The special conditions of state building necessitated the simultaneous absorption of mass immigration, and the fixation of the newly-expanded borders following the 1948 War. Mizrahi immigrants, who streamed to Israel during the early 1950s from Arab

countries, were largely settled by the state along its new borders, where they lived in overcrowded conditions and were employed as cheap labor (Bernstein & Swirski, 1982). During the 1990s, large numbers of immigrants from the former Soviet Union joined these communities. These lower-status communities have been the target of Lebanese rocket attacks since the 1980s and of similar Palestinian projectiles since the year 2000.

Against this backdrop, the government has refrained, as much as possible, from launching large-scale ground operations that would have required risking the lives of soldiers, especially soldiers drawn from the middle-class, who have mainly staffed elite units and reserve battalions. Instead, these peripheral communities have been exposed to a greater risk. As former Chief of the General Staff Dan Halutz argued in a newspaper interview long after his retirement: "Today, in the State of Israel it became less legitimate that a soldier dies and more legitimate that a citizen dies. For us, a soldier at the age of 20 is 'our child,' while the citizen, heaven forbid, killed in [the border towns of] Sderot or Kiryat Shmona is not 'our child'" (cited in Lam, 2010, 31).

Nonetheless, continuing fatalities among citizens, and an ever-widening circle of fatalities extending outward, from residents of the periphery to more "privileged" residents, has taken place in both arenas, while casualty sensitivity continues to minimize the risk to soldiers. The state's tendency to protect its soldiers has clashed with its increased vulnerability to pressures from potentially organized citizens. Therefore, non-lethal solutions were chosen. In the Gaza case, the dilemma was resolved by opting for a military-diplomatic arrangement, namely the Egypt-brokered ceasefire agreement with Hamas in June 2008. Similarly, during Operation Pillar of Defense, the eight-day Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip in November 2012, Israel's missile-blocking defense system, Iron Dome, partly eased the same dilemma. It mitigated the risk to large civilian communities, while aerial attacks failed to stop fire from Gaza into Israel, and a massive ground operation on Gazan soil suffered from low legitimacy to use force (international constraints) and low legitimacy for sacrifice (domestic casualty-sensitivity). Israel therefore, again opted later for an informal ceasefire agreement with Hamas. Likewise, at the end of the Second Lebanon War, the government chose a ceasefire instead of a massive ground operation, even at the price of not achieving most of the war's original goals (Levy, 2012, 142-144).

Another level of protection for soldiers is provided by deploying contractors. This can partially mitigate the impact of over-shielding soldiers, while at the same time exposing contractors to risk instead of soldiers. Not for nothing has the ratio of contractors to military personnel in the U.S. military in Iraq risen since 2003. Not only has deploying contractors helped decrease the number of casualties among soldiers, but the contractors' poor bargaining power together with their lower level of transparency to the public and their image as "working" rather than as "serving," have all had implications in reducing the public's interest in the military in general, and in casualties in particular (Avant & Sigelman, 2010; McCoy 2010, 687).

In sum, low legitimacy for sacrifice restricts military deployment, as Cell C depicts. When this pairs with a low legitimacy to use force in a manner that cannot balance out casualty sensitivity by shifting the risk to enemy civilians, deployment is further restricted, relative to the situation when this legitimacy is higher. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, if engagement with the local population could have been averted, U.S. troops would have been able to rely on standoff strikes alone. With lower receptivity to international pressures, Israeli troops could have done the same by, for instance, targeting Lebanese civilians instead of considering sending troops for hunting down individual missile launchers. However, with lower legitimacy to use force, the state may opt for less lethal alternatives. It can pursue options for diplomatic solutions, or for protecting soldiers more than its own civilians by employing risk-aversion practices. At best, the state provides the same level of security, but by less lethal means. Yet, given that the pursuit of these means emerged following the failure to extract human resources at the required level of readiness to sacrifice, it is likely that the state would take risks that it may have refrained from taking under other conditions.

4. Targeting Enemy Noncombatants

Moving one step further, the state may be called to risk its soldiers again. Compromising security interests and risking citizens may have high political costs. Costs may stem from risks and losses extended and applied to privileged citizens, or from accusations against the government for failing to deal with vital security interests. As the U.S. case suggests, immediately after the attacks of September 11, neoconservatives in and out of the government began pressing insistently for an all-out invasion of Iraq (Bacevich, 2005, 92). Roger Ailes, the head of the popular FOX News network, gave the president advice: "The American public would tolerate waiting and would be patient, but only as long as they were convinced that

Bush was using the harshest measures possible. Support would dissipate if the public did not see Bush acting harshly" (Woodward, 2002, 207).

In the case of Israel, while the ceasefire in Lebanon has brought calm (at the time of writing) the results have been less favorable to Israel in the Gazan arena. Hamas violated the ceasefire of 2008, or at least this was the general impression, and refused to renew the truce agreement under the original conditions. Meanwhile, it intensified its rocketing of Israel's civilian population and expanded the range of its rockets to about forty kilometers, until almost 750,000 Israelis were under threat. The value of the stakes shifted from protecting a narrow strip of border communities to securing more than 10 percent of Israel's population, including citizens who, although living in a geographically peripheral area, were part of the social elite (Levy, 2012, 167). Under such conditions, the legitimacy to use force was on the rise.

Nonetheless, risking soldiers still entailed the same challenges that hitherto had encouraged the state to reduce the risks placed on soldiers by shifting part of the risk to its citizens. In such cases, the demand for protection in terms of using force is not matched by the willingness to sacrifice to protect others.

Hence, the state faces a significant challenge stemming from the death hierarchy: if it cannot demilitarize the political culture, it must leverage the legitimacy to use force as a mechanism of risk reduction. Indeed, one way to mitigate the tensions inherent in the state's duties toward its citizens and soldiers is to use excessive lethality. This may claim more civilian casualties from the enemy, but decrease the soldiers' exposure to risk, while being portrayed as protecting the country's security interests; namely, protecting its own civilians. Soldiers' lives are prioritized over the noncombatants' lives when it is clear that the public is worried about military casualties to a greater extent than it is about civilian casualties, as was the case in the U.S. on the eve of the Iraq War (Larson & Savych, 2006, 169-170). Enemy noncombatants are thus brought into the death hierarchy and placed on the lowest rung. They become part of the hierarchy in the sense that their position is affected by the position of others group on the hierarchy.

Excessive use of force is an integral part of the vocationalization and technologization most Western militaries have undergone since the 1980s, as they shifted from a labor-intensive military to a professional capital-and firepower-intensive military (Caverley, 2009-2010).

Technologization, and more specifically RMA (the Revolution in Military Affairs), answered the need for swift campaigns with minimal casualties (Schörnig & Lembcke, 2006). RMA-informed doctrine reduces the scope and intensity of military sacrifice by reducing soldiers' exposure to risk, shortens the duration of war by using "shock and awe" methods, and lessens the intimacy between the operators and their victims as a way of lessening their pangs of conscience. It is a clear form of how state agencies bypass, rather than mobilize, society to war (Vennesson, 2011).

Cell D captures this situation: a higher degree of legitimacy to use force compensates for a low degree of legitimacy for sacrifice. A tradeoff between force and casualties is thus set in motion.

For democracies, this tradeoff posits a tension between liberal norms and military practices. Democratic imperatives demand respect for noncombatant immunity, as democratic values promote tolerance, nonviolence, and respect for legal constraints (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay 2004, 382). Thus, democracies face protests by nongovernmental organizations against the disproportional use of force that causes unnecessary suffering and violates international law (Hills, 2004), generating, according to Martin Shaw (2002, 355), "adverse global media coverage." McCartney (2010, 419) describes this tension:

What the British public has not taken into account is . . . that by requiring the armed forces to minimize civilian casualties, [this] exposes them to greater danger on the ground. Yet at the same time, the public wants to preserve the right to life of those soldiers, which can be achieved only by minimizing their exposure to danger in theatre. On the one hand the public requires more from their armed forces, and on the other it requires less. This is a conundrum that is difficult to resolve.

To resolve this tension, a tradeoff works when avoiding casualties is legitimately compensated for by the use of force aimed at reducing casualties. High legitimacy for using force thus balances out the low legitimacy for sacrifice. Without this balance, especially when the use of force is less justified, the state may pursue less-lethal solutions and even provide less security, as Cell C of the death hierarchy suggests.

Trading casualties for additional force is both a new and an old phenomenon. Downes (2008) found that democracies, with their heightened cost sensitivity and defeat phobia, are more likely than non-democracies to target noncombatants in protracted wars of attrition, as a means of coercing the adversary into giving up quickly and at a minimum cost to their own side. What is new is that this logic has been extended to the tactical level, mainly with the advent of precision weapons that has led American strategists to fine-tune risk management (Smith, 2008, 147-148). Noncombatants are collaterally targeted, especially in urban warfare, as a way to avert the risk to soldiers that a more precise, surgical operation might necessitate. Martin Shaw (2002, 355) clearly recognized the values involved in this exchange:

The care taken for civilians is not only less than the care taken for American soldiers, it is undermined by a policy adopted to keep the latter safe. Risk to civilians is reduced not as far as practically possible, but as far as judged necessary to avoid adverse global media coverage. Civilians' risks are proportional not to the risks to soldiers . . . but to the political risks of adverse media coverage.

A striking example of this tradeoff can be seen in the Kosovo airstrikes in 1999. Legitimacy for using force was medium, in light of the debate within the U.S. administration and between the U.S. and its NATO allies over whether to become involved militarily in Kosovo. However, once the decision was made to act, political leaders also directed highly restricted bombing of Serb targets, aiming at minimizing civilian collateral damage in Serbia or Kosovo (Feaver, 2003, 273-276).

At the same time, the legitimacy for sacrifice was low. Casualty sensitivity constrained airstrikes in order to secure the lives of NATO's soldiers while the option of a ground campaign was ruled out (Feaver, 2003, 273-276). However, casualty-averse policies went further and sparked a debate over the consequences of their implementation. One controversial tactic generally restricted NATO warplanes to flying below 15,000 feet, in order to provide maximum protection for the pilots, thus making discrimination between military forces and civilian noncombatants more difficult. Also problematic was the avoidance of launching a ground campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing (see Dunlap, 2000; Murphy, 2002). And even if Dunlap is correct in arguing that alternative tactics could have risked the local population to a higher extent, the original logic was guided by risk-aversion. Both former US Secretary of Defense William Cohen and General Wesley Clark, commander of US forces in

Europe during the Kosovo operation, publicly stated that risk-aversion played a major role (Caniglia, 2001, 73-74). Cell C captures this situation of low level legitimacies, yielding force-protection and risk-aversion, which ultimately compromise the interests that initially guided the mission.

Nonetheless, even within the U.S. forces, Marine units (as well as Allied soldiers) risked themselves by living in the areas for which they were responsible, and by protecting the population. Conversely, Army forces were plagued by excessive force-protection and casualty aversion, and thereby isolated themselves from the population (Hyde, 2000, 25-26).

Yet, the ineffectiveness of restricted bombing helped military commanders expand the airstrikes and relax civilian monitoring gradually from April 1999, especially as the alternative options were to admit defeat or launch a ground force. Failure to stop the accelerated ethnic cleansing also involved public shifts in the U.S. toward a more aggressive posture in the air (Coletta & Feaver, 2006). A move from Cell C to D was then at work. With higher legitimacy to use force, expanded airstrikes produced more collateral damage. In ten perceived problematic incidents alone, which took place beginning in April, between 273 and 317 noncombatants were killed, out of a total of approximately 500 noncombatants killed during the campaign (Final Report to the Prosecutor, paragraphs 9, 53). NATO, however, ended the war with zero (direct) casualties. Tradeoff between force and casualties was manifested.

When the U.S. coped with past traumas of casualties and launched ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also endeavored to reduce casualties. Casualty aversion was partly promoted by risk aversion through the armorizing and employment of forward operating bases, as described earlier. More significant has been the shifting of the burden of risk from the troops to those whom the mission is intended to protect, manifested by the application of heavy firepower against the local population. Liberal use of force, mainly airstrikes, protected the soldiers, thanks to the extraction of technology, but it also produced collateral damage by killing noncombatants. The local population thus became alienated (Gibson, 2009; Herring & Rangwala, 2006, 180), and were provided legitimization for insurgent violence.

A notable example is the siege on the Iraqi city of Fallujah in April 2004, the biggest operation after Iraq's defeat. High legitimacy to use force interacted with low legitimacy to

sacrifice. Legitimacy to use force was enhanced by the need to retaliate for the killing of four American contractors and in order to reassume control of the city where Shiite insurgency mounted; however, the intent was to do this swiftly, rather than gradually, as preferred by the local, more prudent, commanders (Hills, 2006; McChrystal, 2013, 128-130). At the same time, the traditional ethic of force-protection prescribed the exercising of disproportionate force and the use of airstrikes to counter heavy resistance on the ground (Hills, 2006). The result was reflected in the fatalities ratio of 1:16 (36 American soldiers to approximately 600 Iraqi noncombatants). However, casualty rates intensified pressures, most significantly from the Iraqi and British governments, to halt the operation. A ceasefire was therefore imposed before the goals were attained. This operation turned Fallujans against the U.S. and helped the insurgents gain legitimacy and sympathy for their cause (De Lira, 2009).

It follows that the U.S. employed hybrid tactics, captured between Cell C to D. Low legitimacy for sacrifice was both translated into force protection and the targeting of local civilians. Legitimacy for using force was to a moderate degree: not high enough to rely exclusively on standoff fire (that could have been used in a limited scale as the Fallujah operation showed), but not low enough to increase the soldiers' risk.

Britain, who fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S. in both theatres more than any other American allies, represented a different approach. Its rules of engagement were tightened. It scaled responses up or down according to ongoing risk assessments, while U.S. rules were more lenient, more abstract, and more reactive in how they responded to risk, thus encouraging earlier escalation. No less important, British troops were more engaged than the Americans with the local population from the beginning of the invasion, but at the same time were more tolerated because they did little to interfere in the conflicts between the local groups (mainly in Basra) (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, 4; Herring & Rangwala, 2006, 163; Smith, 2008, 154).

Two main explanations account for the differences between the militaries. First, political culture plays a role. Britain is far less concerned with casualties than the U.S., and casualty shyness has been reflected in the public discourse infrequently, and then only as a derivative, rather than a primary, topic. Evidently, the growing number of casualties raised questions about adequate equipment for force-protection and the medical treatment of wounded soldiers (Edmunds, 2012, 279; Forster, 2012, 277), and not reservations about the mission itself.


Different political cultures also matter: the political culture in the U.S. appreciates individualistic values more than in Britain; Britain has a long tradition of the empire fighting wars for the sake of economic survival, which, in the past, drove it to fight wars to sustain itself on sea and shore far from home, which involved human costs. In contrast, the U.S. experienced wars directly linked to home defense or to protecting American ideals, not economic survival. Therefore, in the U.S. it is more complicated than in Britain to justify wars conducted far from home. As a result, national interests are defined differently (Caniglia, 2001; Cassidy, 2008, 98).

Second, the armies are trained and socialized in different ways. In Britain, the imperial tradition, including the experience in Northern Ireland, trained soldiers to deal with civil populations, to function in small units with limited technology, and to practice persuasion and use force only when no other choice existed (Caniglia, 2001, 80; Cassidy, 2008, 93; UK Army, 2008, 7). In a different manner, American soldiers are trained to use technology to solve problems, even in a manner divorced from politics (see Hills, 2006), and are guided by an aspiration to achieve quick results. They are trained to carry out a fighting role informed by the 'Warrior Ethos.' This ethos leans towards *destroying the enemy*, not *defeating it*, while "defeating the enemy" could permit a number of other politically attuned options (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, 6-14). For Americans, moreover, technological warfare was attractive to officers; by minimizing collateral damage, it offered promise for mitigating the effects of legal and political constraints on air operations (Waxman, 2000). In short, while the U.S. traded force for casualties (Cell D on Figure 1), Britain remained close to Cell A2 with relatively high legitimacy to sacrifice, paired with low legitimacy to use force.

Israel offers another example for modifications of the death hierarchy determined by the interplay between legitimacies. Figure 2 shows the increasing number of Palestinian civilian fatalities (directly killed by Israeli fire) for each Israeli casualty between 2000 and 2009, during which Israel conducted warfare in Gaza against armed militias (unlike the first intifada of 1987-1993 which was an unarmed resistance). Three periods are reviewed: 2000-2005 (The Al-Aqsa Intifada); August 2005-December 2008 (Israel's bombing and limited ground operations in reaction to rocketing from Gaza, following its withdrawal from Gaza and the evacuation of Israeli settlements); and December 2008-January 2009 (Operation Cast Lead) (data drawn from Levy, 2012, 153-155). Such a ratio is a suitable tool to test the extent to which the tradeoff between force (yielding fatalities) and casualties (reflecting the legitimacy

to sacrifice) really works. It indicates the extent to which Israeli soldiers were exposed to risk in their activity among the civilian population. Variations in this ratio represent variations in the level of casualty shyness in tandem with variations in the legitimacy to use substantial force.

Figure 2: Fatalities Ratio- Palestinian Noncombatants to One Israeli Soldier



As the figure shows, the ratio of casualties increased dramatically from 1:9 (one Israeli soldier to nine Palestinian noncombatants) in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, to 1: 84 in Cast Lead. This ratio reflects how Israel traded force for casualties in an attempt to balance the two systems of legitimacy.

Figure 2 demonstrates variations in the death hierarchy. Consistently, the legitimacy for using force increased with the combination of two factors: (1) Escalated Palestinian hostilities from warfare by armed squads during the Al-Aqsa Intifada to rocketing on Israeli towns. (2) Changing the mode of control by lessening Israel's responsibility toward the Gazan population from one of high commitment to an occupied population. This restricted Israel's aggressiveness during the First Intifada, becoming a more relaxed commitment when Gaza became a partly autonomous political entity following Oslo, and extended its autonomy following the withdrawal and the settlements evacuation (Levy, 2012, 127-145, based on the concepts of Ron, 2003). At the same time, the legitimacy for sacrifice declined as well in the years 2000-2008, as Israeli society became sensitive to casualties, particularly following the

unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. As noted earlier, this sensitivity peaked on the eve of the Gaza offensive of 2008.

The main shift took place on the eve of, and following, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. This redeployment was partly criticized as a move which sacrificed long-term security interests, even though it eliminated unjustifiable losses, such as those caused by a series of guerrilla attacks in 2004, which resulted in the deaths of 20 soldiers deployed on the line that separated the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, Chief of the General Staff, as well as other generals, clearly argued that a unilateral withdrawal would provide a tailwind for terrorism (Burston, 2004); that would risk Israeli citizens. While low legitimacy to sacrifice drove the withdrawal, it also encouraged aerial and artillery attacks without risky ground operations, when the Gazans rocketed Israeli towns after the withdrawal. At the same time, the withdrawal lessened Israel's commitment to the population, and thus increased the legitimacy to use force. Low legitimacy to sacrifice with high legitimacy to use force allowed Israel to act within the boundaries of Cell D, shifting the risk from soldiers to enemy noncombatants.

On the eve of Operation Cast Lead in 2008, concerns about military casualties mounted, inhibiting decision-makers who were considering a ground offensive into Gaza, in spite of rocketing on Israeli civilians. With such low legitimacy to sacrifice, the offensive into Gaza could only be launched when it became legitimate to use the weapons arsenal more liberally to better protect the soldiers' lives. Such an opportunity revealed itself in December 2008. As noted, Hamas could be presented as violating the ceasefire while it also intensified its rocketing of Israel's civilian population and expanded the range of its rockets. Against this background, Israel could claim legitimacy from both the international community and from its own citizenry for a massive attack that might overthrow Hamas. Low legitimacy for sacrifice was compensated for by high legitimacy for using force, leading to the Cast Lead operation in 2008.

In this operation, Israel launched a weeklong airstrike against Hamas' security installations and personnel, followed by a ground invasion that lasted another two weeks. Overwhelming power, including airstrikes and, later, a massive ground thrust, reduced the soldiers' exposure to risk, at the expense of enemy noncombatants (Bart 2009). In other cases, Israeli troops used noncombatants as human shields to protect soldiers (United Nations 2009, 19). Rules of

engagement allowed the soldiers to return fire toward the source of hostile fire even if noncombatants were around and even to initiate firefighting to avoid risk (Harel 2009). Risk-aversion practices even filtered down the military chain of command and were internalized by the soldiers who took part in the ground operation (Breaking the Silence, 2009, 20, 27). Consequently, most of the civilian fatalities among women and children occurred during the ground offensive or as a result of it, by means of aerial bombing that provided covering fire to the ground units (B'Tselem, 2009, 4).

Thus, we can see a clear difference between the three militaries under study. U.K. forces act within the boundaries of Cell A. Tolerance of sacrifice together with respect for the local population yield readiness to sacrifice soldiers to protect the local noncombatants. In a different manner, the U.S. forces target noncombatants more liberally to protect the troops, mainly out of lower legitimacy to sacrifice soldiers' lives and a weaker ethos of respect towards the occupied population. Such conduct is well captured in the space between Cells C to D. In sharp contrast, force-protection, rather than building trust or reducing enmity, was paramount in Israel's policy, clearly captured in Cell D.

Reducing enmity, however, is not only a moral or political issue, but also a pure security issue, as long as Israel's ability to provide security to the communities adjacent to the Gaza Strip is based, beyond military deterrence, on some degree of cooperation with the Gazan communities, and their ability to build a normal life. Both were at odds with the destruction of civilian property and infrastructure that the operation caused (Cohen, 2009). On the other hand, the U.S.-led coalition forces ultimately left Iraq and are preparing to leave Afghanistan, but have nevertheless paid more attention than the Israelis to the political order they shaped prior to pulling out. Paradoxically, Israel is more sensitive to casualties because of the impact of the manpower system. Conscription, which is practiced in Israel, breeds more casualty sensitivity-driven casualty aversion than in societies employing volunteer forces (see Vasquez, 2005).

To a large extent, the RMA-informed doctrine was developed as a reaction to rising casualty sensitivity, thereby avoiding the need to reduce security levels resulting from favoring soldiers over citizens. As this doctrine matured and the technological capacity to tactically trade force for casualties developed, risking citizens or compromising security interests became less likely. Risking civilians became an issue only when the technology needed to

safeguard soldiers was not used because of limited legitimacy to risk noncombatants, as the cases in Cell C show. The trading of force for casualties is chosen by democracies only when risking soldiers is restricted, or when risking civilians or compromising security interests is likely while risking enemy noncombatants is considered relatively legitimate.

5. Re-Risking Soldiers

Political and military leaders may re-modify the death hierarchy once again if they acknowledge that targeting noncombatants provides less, rather than more, protection to their own civilians, and even further risks the soldiers themselves. In other words, leaders understand that the impact of that policy, which is located in Cell D, is similar to the one depicted in Cell C.

A case in point is the *Petraeus Doctrine*, named for General David Petraeus, commander of the multinational force in Iraq. American commanders in Iraq acknowledged that violence against noncombatants had embittered Iraqis and incited the insurgency (Smith, 2008, 160-161). Hence, soldiers were further exposed to risk, especially as force-protection limited effectiveness. The counterproductive impact of force-protection was epitomized by the dictum "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be" (United States Department of the Army, 2007, 48).

As a result of the counterproductive impact, commanders revised the doctrine of force-protection, drafting the Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2006. Improving security for Iraq's population by separating, rather than killing, the enemy, became the overriding objective of the new policy. It was implemented by increasing the presence of military personnel in local neighborhoods, and by living "among the people," even though this increased the short-term risks for coalition forces (Caldwell, 2011, 229-241). This moreover meant a decrease in firepower and a prohibition of using artillery in order to minimize collateral damage (Petraeus, 2009). Gaining the local civilians' confidence became a primary goal, thereby creating an environment that was inhospitable to the insurgency (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2006, 41). Success was now measured by the level of civilian violence (Hall & Stahl, 2008, 40). Force-protection became a secondary priority, with the revised doctrine supplanting the 1990s' Powell Doctrine, with its emphasis on the use of overwhelming force to save soldiers' lives (Bacevich, 2008). To this end, officers even pushed civilians to a short-term increase in the number of American troops. Later, the Petraeus

Doctrine was emulated in Afghanistan as well. Moving from Cell D closer to Cell A2 was a process which included increasing legitimacy to sacrifice that diminished the legitimacy to use force.

Ultimately, the fatality ratio between U.S. soldiers to Iraqi noncombatants killed by direct fire of U.S. soldiers slightly decreased from 2 to 1.7 following the introduction of the Petraeus Plan (comparing the period 2004-2006 after transferring sovereignty to Iraq to the Surge of 2007-2009).¹ The doctrine somewhat lowered this ratio, and in 2009, violence was significantly less than in 2004. Still, the counterinsurgency manual may have solely played a symbolic role on the ground and did not subsequently influence drastic changes in the way the US military operated. As one commander even said "shaking hands in the light and killing at night" (Lacey, 2011). Likewise, the decline in violence is not attributable only to the shift to counterinsurgency, but also to other developments, particularly the defeat of Sunni militias by Shia militias in Baghdad, the subsequent decision by many Sunni leaders to collaborate with the U.S., and the decision by the Sadrist forces to stand down (Branch & Wood, 2010). However, no less significant is the revised policy in itself and the successful mustering of public support for it, that is, for a willingness to risk soldiers.

Conclusions

A state shapes and reshapes the 'death hierarchy,' which is the hierarchy of risk, according to which the state positions the lives of its citizens, its soldiers, and the enemy noncombatants. Under the republicanism-informed mass citizen armies, the state risked the lives of soldiers drawn from privileged groups more often than those from the working classes, because it trusted the former more than the latter and also compensated the privileged groups accordingly; unequal burden translated into, and was compensated for, by a privileged social position. However, when this exchange was undermined, resulting in shortfalls for rewarding privileged groups, democracies risked soldiers drawn from the lower classes more than the

¹ The data drawn from iCasualties and Iraq Body Count. ICasualties considered only US soldiers killed by hostile action (including friendly fire) in areas under direct US command. Data on Iraqi noncombatants killed solely by US forces has not been found, nor did US authorities tally such numbers. However, the Iraq Body Count database was able to provide numbers killed by US-led forces (not including Iraqi soldiers) in specific zones within Iraq. It was therefore assumed that those noncombatants killed in zones under US control were most likely killed as a result of US action due to the latter's predominant role there.

ones drawn from privileged groups. This has been the trend since the 1970s, and has entailed phasing out of the draft in most Western countries and realignment of the social composition of the militaries. When such reluctance to serve is overwhelming, or the social realignment matures slowly, the state may even favor the lives of its soldiers over those of its citizens thereby reducing the level of protection it offers, which is the inverse of the norms governing the state. However, when the state can no longer risk its citizens for a long period or in a high scale manner, and must risk its soldiers again, it may resort to the use of excessive force, shifting the risk from the soldiers to the enemy noncombatants. But if this casualty-aversion-informed policy proves counterproductive, the state may modify the hierarchy once again and put its soldiers under a higher threat, as the *Petraeus Doctrine* signaled.

Through these insights, this article addressed two scholarly deficits. First, the lack of an analysis demonstrating how multiple situations, by which the state differentially risks specific groups, as a rich literature has shown, integrate into a unified hierarchy of death. As demonstrated, once the state favored one group, it hierarchically increased the risk to which other groups are exposed. Second, it is necessary to explain how the hierarchy is shaped and reshaped. Here the legitimacy for sacrifice as deduced from the scholarship surrounding casualty sensitivity was factored together with the legitimacy to use force. Only the interplay of both sets of legitimacies can explain variations in military policies producing variations in the structure of the death hierarchy.

As shown, each variation in the death hierarchy reflects, as much as determines, modification in the military doctrine. War is not just a chaotic phenomenon; deliberate policies lead to particular, predictable outcomes owing to the way the state favors one group over another.

Such interplay is even more significant in its implication on military policies given that the two sets of legitimacies may be mutually reinforcing. Declining legitimacy to sacrifice requires a greater effort to achieve an increase in the legitimacy to use overwhelming force (Cell D on Figure 1). Several mechanisms may be used to achieve this: (1) mission selection, as the Weinberger and Powell doctrines suggest, that is, restriction of the use of force to situations in which an overwhelming reaction is legitimated. Similar, are the circumstances chosen by Israel to launch the offensive in Gaza; (2) lessening responsibility toward the occupied population, as the case of Israel suggests; (3) legitimization of the use of force by affecting, even manipulating, the relevant variables, such as inflating the external threat,

realigning the military's composition and armament; (4) high casualty shyness can in itself be used as a legitimization mechanism to justify high lethality, as the case of Israel revealed in particular.

However, declining legitimacy to sacrifice without an increase in legitimacy to use force may have driven the state to pursue more moderate policies, rather than to increase its aggressiveness, or to provide less security (Cell C). Furthermore, low legitimacy for sacrifice may encourage critical thinking about the use of force, mainly in terms of its logic and effectiveness, thus lowering the legitimacy to use force, as often occurs when antiwar sentiments mount. Conversely, high legitimacy for sacrifice, typical of a highly militarized society, mutes this sort of critical thinking.

In another way, high legitimacy to use force, augmented by perception of existential threat, may increase tolerance for casualties (Jentleson & Britton, 1998) (Cell B). Nevertheless, as the counterinsurgency case reveals, questioning the utility of using force may also enhance the legitimacy of sacrifice by grasping the extent to which both legitimacies are connected vessels (towards Cell A).

It follows that high level of legitimacy to sacrifice creates a larger decoupling between the legitimacies and thereby enhances the state's freedom of action. In a different way, when this legitimacy to sacrifice declines, this encourages more interplay between the two sets of legitimacies to deal with the legitimacy deficit, and often may lead to greater aggressiveness.

As states shape and reshape death hierarchies, the scholarly effort not only serves to increase the understanding of this dimension of military doctrine; but also raises public awareness of this aspect of the "risk society," with its implications for the way in which the state promotes the public's long-term interests.

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