How Soldiers Control the Military from Within

Yagil Levy
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Abstract

This paper attempts to fill scholarly gaps by theorizing the theme of "control from within" of the military and its determinants by using theories about collective action. Control from within is the intentional action taken by soldiers in an attempt to bargain with the military or affect its functioning. Control from within can be synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic control is exercised when soldiers strive to exert influence over a military mission in real time, while diachronic control is based mainly on research and documentation aiming at influencing military conduct post-factum. It is argued that the likelihood of development, as well as the type, of control from within is dependent on the interplay of two variables: the level of presence of soldiers belonging to the same social group, and the group's social status within, and outside, the military.

Introduction

Civilian control refers to the joint institutional arrangements aimed at restraining the military’s capacity for autonomous action in areas that have political implications. These may include military operations and strategic planning, budgeting, the selection of weapons systems, modes of organization, modes of recruitment, the promotion of officers, and internal cultural arrangements. Civilian control is effective when civilian state institutions are able to set limits on the military’s freedom of action in a way that corresponds to political objectives autonomously shaped by politicians, and when the military abides by these civilian directives (see mainly Feaver, 1999; Michael, 2007).
Accordingly, civilian control can be conceptualized as an action limiting the military's freedom of operation. What is important is the action itself and its consequences, rather than the identity of the controlling institutions, or the formal arrangements designated to support the mechanisms of control.

The literature on civilian control has focused mainly on political and institutional structures and the dialogue between officers and politicians (this approach typifies, for example, Feaver, 2003; Feaver & Gelpi, 2003). Less attention has been paid to the power relations that form the context for the encounter between the two sides and, as Mills (1956, p.21) explained, is more crucial than the black box in which decisionmaking occurs. When the balance of power between the sides is dealt with (as in Desch, 2001), the focus is on the reflection of this balance in a bilateral civil-military dialogue, rather than on the social-cultural processes that construct the power relations. Although there are several relevant areas in which the analysis of civilian control ignores these power relations, I will focus on the role of the recruitment model.

The recruitment model affects the power structure in society, and hence also affects the political supervision of the military. Three forms of influence are recognized in the literature:

First, the mode of recruitment largely determines the propensity or ability of the armed forces to forcefully intervene in domestic politics. Kier's (1995) mapping of the debates in France and Britain during the interwar period suggests this linkage. By and large, with all other factors being equal, the shorter the length of service, the lower this propensity is, as the militia-like character prevails over the military culture.
Second, the mode of recruitment affects the state institutions' autonomy in deploying the military. Conscription requires service from the willing and unwilling alike, while a volunteer force does not. Consequently, a conscripted military includes citizens who are most averse to the sacrifice involved, and are therefore most likely to protest when the legitimacy of sacrifice is questionable (Vasquez, 2009, 85-88). A system of obligatory service also increases the stake of citizens in the goals of policy, and prompts legislators to play a more active role in foreign policy, in order to better serve their constituents (Avant and Sigelman 2010, 241). Furthermore, conscription touches more powerful actors more directly, than voluntary service. Thus, citizens and groups with political power, who may form a critical mass in the ranks, are potentially much more politically engaged under conscription because of the vulnerability of their members to compulsory service (Vasquez, 2005). When free choice plays a major role in the decision to join the ranks, as typified by a volunteer system, these rules work in the opposite direction.

Third, the mode of recruitment affects the propensity to use force. Scholarly discourse has often echoed the controversy over the Kantian question of which type of manpower system – conscription, or an all voluntary army – constrains leaders from dispatching troops on military missions. Leaders' military experience, as affected by the manpower system (Choi & James, 2004; Feaver & Gelpi, 2003), manpower costs (Chambers, 1987), and the level of training, professionalism, and motivation of the troops (Pickering, 2010, 120-123), are among the variables impacting the propensity to use force (see Choi and James, 2004 for a summary of part of these variables).

In sum, scholars largely agree that the mode of recruitment affects the way the political community controls its armed forces. However, three gaps are identified in the literature.
First, a thorough analysis is lacking of the linkage between the social composition of the military and civilian control. Scholars discuss, in general terms, the presence and political ramifications of elites vis-à-vis lower social classes in the military, but do not offer a more focused discussion on the intergroup composition of the armed forces and its impact on civilian control. At the same time, military sociologists do address the political dimension of this social composition. For example, several studies have pointed out that primary group cohesion, which may be highly enhanced by social homogeneity, may limit organizational performance. This happens when cohesion encourages the primary group to pursue goals that are at odds with those of the formal organization. This, in turn, may lead to stonewalling, may prevent the proper investigation of criminal activities, interfere with the chain of command, and ultimately impede the proper functioning of the overall organization (Kier, 1998; Winslow, 1998). Scholars dealing with diversity management through a different perspective show how social groups are varied in their attitudes toward the performance of military missions (see, for example, Miller and Moskos, 1995). Yet, these sociological discussions have not been linked to the general issue of civilian control.

Second, an analysis of less formal patterns of civilian control is missing. The focus on the institutional pattern of control, that is, the dialogue between officers and civilians, is dominant. Receiving less focus are extra-institutional actors. Levy and Michael (2011) proposed dealing with this neglected area by offering the concept of extra-institutional civilian control, which refers to actions generally taken by non-bureaucratic actors (mainly social movements and interest groups) acting in the public sphere, in an attempt to bargain with the military or restrain it. This may be done either directly or through civilian state institutions. Ultimately, extra-institutional
mechanisms are effective at restraining the military and narrowing its professional autonomous space.

Among the arenas of action selected by extra-institutional actors, the authors highlight "Direct Control." Here, the actors "step into the state’s shoes." They not only introduce an issue and expect the state to tackle it, as typified by the conventional model of citizen involvement in civilian control, but directly monitor the military units to ensure that the required policy is indeed implemented. Still underdeveloped in this analysis, is the specification of the conditions under which extra-institutional mechanisms of control emerge from the ranks, the variations in these mechanisms, and their linkage to manpower policies.

In general, a rich body of scholarship deals with several patterns of subversive action that emerge from the ranks, such as conscientious objection (see Foley, 2003 on the Vietnam War), leaking and other forms of whistle-blowing (Brenner, 2010), soldiers' reports to civilians (Lewes, 2003), and more. Here the aim is to drive senior levels of commanders, and even the political echelon, to action. However, such dissident behavior is not linked to civilian control.

A better link has recently been offered by Ruffa, Dandeker and Vennesson (2013). They argue that because of the increasing importance of the tactical level in peacekeeping operations and the new interventionist wars, there are new ways through which soldiers can, intentionally or not, affect domestic politics. For example, misbehaving or making tactical or operational decisions that have political repercussions or may affect the functioning of the military, are cases in point. However, less considered in this study are situations in which soldiers, motivated by prior ideological agendas, intentionally attempt to affect policies. "What is political is
not the act itself but the context and responses to the act” say the authors (p. 327), while there are situations in which the act can be political in and of itself.

Third, the literature cited above, addressing the linkage between the recruitment model and the propensity to use force, is focused on decisionmaking regarding initiating or exiting war. Less studied, however, is the dynamic of war management, or the management of military policies which may escalate to war, or may decrease aggression. It is possible that initially, the leadership does not intend to use force, but escalation constrains its moves towards bellicosity, or vise versa. Here, analyzing the way in which the field command, guided by socially-originated ideological beliefs, implements political directives, either generating escalation or de-escalation, offers a missing dimension to the impact of manpower policies on policymaking.

This paper attempts to fill these gaps, at least in part. My goal is to theorize the theme of "control from within," and its determinants by using theories about collective action. Control from within of the military is the intentional action taken by soldiers in an attempt to bargain with the military or affect its functioning, either synchronically (in real time) or diachronically (post factum). It is argued that the likelihood of development, as well as type of control from within is yielded by the interplay of two variables: the level of presence of soldiers belonging to the same social group, and the group's social status within and outside the military.

Methodologically, I use the case of Israel as a single-case study. On the surface, Israel is unique in that it is a conscript military involved in a protracted war. More than in volunteer forces, a conscript military brings to the ranks soldiers from different backgrounds, whose agendas do not necessarily conform to that of the military command and its civilian supervisors. Therefore, more viable conditions for subversive behaviors are created. And, once subversion appears, a conscript military
sets different limits than does a volunteer one, on the soldiers' space of action to dissent. Nevertheless, it is these conditions that make the Israeli situation a suitable pilot case study.

As Yin (2009, 49, 92) maintained, there are several rationales for single-case designs, among them, the use of a single-case study as a pilot case. Though this kind of study cannot be regarded as a complete study on its own, it can be formative in conceptual terms. It is justified when its complexity, compared to probable other cases, means that data collected will be relevant to other cases as well. Indeed, a conscript military functioning in a politically divided environment promises the rich, but complicated, data necessary for theorization. In all-volunteer forces, with less politically diversified ranks, and with less impetus to resist policies, the situation is less complicated, and therefore, less appealing for a formative study.

The first section conceptualizes "control from within," followed by a section offering an empirical examination. The third section offers the conditions under which specific forms of this mode of control are developed, and the last section reconnects this mode to the broader concept of civilian control.

**Control from Within**

Control from within emerges when soldiers engage in directing the military by multiple means. By and large, control by soldiers is among the republican principles of the political community's control over its violent resources. In other words, soldiers sacrifice in return for social, civil and political rights granted mainly to the social networks from which they were sent. Among these rights is the political right to control the armed forces. From the perspective of the soldiers and their social networks, this political right is used to ensure that the military is deployed to
implement the agreed-upon political goals for which the soldiers were enlisted. Antiwar protests that spring from the ranks and their social networks, various forms of disobedience, and the leaking of information from within the ranks concerning the overly aggressive conduct of units, are among the tools operated for the sake of this control. The aim is to drive the senior levels of commanders, and even the political echelon, to act.

Control from within can be synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic control is exercised when soldiers strive to exert influence over a military mission in real time. They identify deviations from ethical norms or formal policies, and attempt to rectify them. To this end, they may turn to their commanders, a pattern which may involve negotiation over the performance of the mission, or try to influence their peers, or even turn to the political echelon directly, or with the mediation of family or media. In contrast, diachronic control is based mainly on research and documentation. Here the goal is not to influence military conduct in real time, but only post-factum. I will now demonstrate these modes of control.

1. Synchronic control

Synchronic control appears in several forms:

1.1 Restraint - soldiers attempt to restrain the use of force within the unit, often at the company level, by interacting with their peers or commanders, especially when the soldiers feel that their peers deviate from, or interpret in an unacceptable manner, the directives of their superiors. During the first Intifada, (the 1987-1993 Palestinian uprising against Israel's rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), an infantry soldier, Ohad Shem Tov, testified about this pattern:
I felt that I should attend at the highest friction points, assuming that if I'm there I can mitigate the evil of other people. When we had to enter a house and I saw another team doing this, I thought this team may have been more violent. When I was conducting a search in a house, it was more targeted without messing up the house. This also applies to the checkpoints-when I'm there, soldiers are not harassing Palestinians ("Soldier Testimony" Website).

In other words, misbehavior is affected by the internal dynamics of the military unit. A significant factor is the mix of soldiers with a propensity to aggression and more sensitive soldiers. Even a minority of conscientious soldiers, who feel moral responsibility not only to themselves, but towards their peers, can have an influence. As this minority grows and individual soldiers discover others who think alike, they can break the conspiracy of silence and report misbehavior to their superiors, as well as attempting to restrain their more aggressive colleagues (see Elitzur & Yishai Koren, 2007 on the first Intifada).

1.2 Gray and Selective Refusal

During the first Lebanon War (1982-1985), selective refusal appeared for the first time in Israel as a significant phenomenon. An organization called Yesh Gvul ("there is a limit/border") was made up of a group of reserve soldiers who organized to selectively refuse to carry out military missions in Lebanon and the occupied territories because of the military's allegedly aggressive behavior.

Selective refusal posed a more significant challenge during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the new round of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian authority, which erupted in 2000, following the failure to achieve a final agreement to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The years 2003-2004 saw the strengthening of the refusal movement. This time, however, in addition to soldiers from elite units, higher-ranking officers were also involved, the most senior being Yiftah Spector, a renowned Air Force pilot with the rank of Brigadier General. For the first time, people who took no part in the fighting itself, but who wished to issue a protest against it in the name of the army and its ethics, had become activists. If the extent of refusal was limited, this was in no small part, due to the IDF’s (Israel Defense Forces) strategy of keeping reserve units, where the potential for refusal is high, away from sensitive missions; of reaching informal agreements with those who insisted on refusing; of limiting public exposure of the phenomenon; and of resorting to public punishment only as a last resort. Increasing rates of “gray refusal” was the result.

In gray refusal, soldiers express their discomfort with sensitive missions that might involve violence against civilians. They negotiate with their commanders, and may have themselves removed from an assignment. These negotiations are conducted quietly, often without the knowledge of senior commanders. Although explicit refusal affects the symbolic power of the military, since it increases its permeability to politics, gray refusal, with a potential to become widespread, may affect the military’s operational capabilities, as the number of fully operational combatants is reduced. The gray refuseniks achieve their goal of having a clean conscience without a voice, and thus, without paying any significant cost.

Towards the end of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2004-2005), it was estimated that there were ten gray refuseniks for every soldier who officially pledged to refuse (Dloomy, 2005, 706-708). This indicates the extent to which disobedience and other phenomena concerned the army, which wanted to contain them tightly. Dov Weisglass, Prime Minister Sharon’s bureau chief, and the main architect of the Disengagement Plan
(Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005), pointed to the growth of the refusal movement as one of the motivations behind the disengagement:

And then [in the fall of 2003] we were hit with letters [of refusal to serve in the territories] from officers, and letters from pilots and letters from commandos. These were not weird kids with green ponytails and nose-rings who give off a strong odor of grass. These were people like Spector’s group [as mentioned above]. Really our finest young people (quoted in Shavit, 2004).

While the synchronic forms of control described thus far were exercised by soldiers belonging to the left-center wing, gray refusal appeared in the right-wing sector as well. In 1993, the Israeli government pledged to the U.S. administration that it would freeze settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the exception of “natural growth” of existing settlements. In response, the settlers’ leadership shifted their energy to expanding existing settlements and illegally building new ones. In 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a commitment to the Bush Administration that he would dismantle those settlement outposts that had been built since he had become prime minister in March 2001, but the government failed to honor this promise. The Sasson Report of 2005, commissioned by the government to investigate the growth in unauthorized outposts, presented a picture of dual networks – formal and informal – in relation to political-military control of the settlement project. It implied that without the IDF’s passive and active cooperation, the illegal settlements could not have been expanded. The soldiers' reluctance was seen as part of the problem: IDF soldiers were often the first on the scene and the first to witness Israelis breaking the law, while the civilian police's presence was more limited. However, the report points out (Sasson, 2005, 45):
…in practice IDF soldiers do not enforce the law, have no knowledge of the Law Enforcement Procedure, and have no interest to function as cops. “The commander spirit”… sees the settlers’ acts building outposts as Zionist deeds, although illegal, and asks them not to inspect such acts through the eyes of the law.

Thus, the social makeup of the military plays a major role in shaping the routine relations between settlers and military units in the West Bank. Realignment of the social composition of the field units ran its course since the 1980s and was particularly felt in the units deployed in the occupied territories. Groups that had previously been relegated to peripheral status in the ranks because of cultural, formal, or educational barriers increased their weight in the combat units. These groups included the lower socio-economic segments of Mizrahi (second and third generation immigrants from Arab countries), religious youth, including some residents of the settlements, new immigrants (mainly from the former Soviet Union and from Ethiopia), and Druze and Bedouin Israelis. This change in the army’s composition was largely affected by the drop in motivation to serve among members of the secular middle class, which opened the way for the integration of more marginalized groups (Levy, 2007).

With regard to the units deployed in the West Bank, it is safe to assume that a different makeup, with the secular middle-class groups having a higher presence in the ranks, could have generated more protest against the military’s cooperation with the settlers, resistance and leaking of information, and more determination to enforce the law on the settlers (see Levy, 2011).
1.3 Political Mobilization

Appealing to the political echelon is one of the forms that enables soldiers to affect the conduct of their unit. This can be done by submitting an open or confidential appeal to the political leadership, or by leaking classified information. In the first Lebanon War, this pattern of action was developed. For example, in the summer of 1982, an armored company commander approached then Minister of Education, Zvulun Hammer, as he was leaving his synagogue on Friday night, and asked to meet with him privately at his home. In this meeting, the officer exposed gaps between what the military and Defense Minister reported to the cabinet, and the real picture. In this way, the officer enlisted the minister's support against a military incursion into Beirut, an issue that was, at the time, on the political agenda (Fisher, 1992).

1.4 Bargaining

While gray refusal exemplifies individual bargaining within army units, patterns of collective bargaining can also emerge.

In 2011, a reserve battalion deployed on the Egyptian-Israeli border refused to carry out the so-called “hot return” policy. Hot return involves the compulsory return of African asylum-seekers to Egypt, where they face torture by Egyptian soldiers. In response, the regional brigade commander agreed to suspend hot return during the service of this battalion, while maintaining this policy during the regular battalion's deployment. Here we see how reservists can affect military policies (Pfeffer, 2011).

Religious soldiers, whose presence in combat units have significantly increased since the 1980s, are even more active in performing this type of bargaining. In 2005, when Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip and evacuated approximately
8,000 Jewish settlers living there, IDF policies were guided by concerns that many religious soldiers might disobey orders to evacuate settlers, under the influence of religious decisions issued by prominent rabbis. For religious soldiers, the evacuation of settlements stood in sharp contrast to their nationalist values. Therefore, the IDF organized the force that was to directly handle the evacuation (including forcefully removing settlers from their homes), in accordance with the hierarchy of the soldiers’ professional (and hence political) loyalties.

A considerable share of the direct evacuation work was assigned to police units. In addition, the IDF established and deployed improvised units of career officers of various ranks to handle the evacuated settlers. Even the outer circle, whose main mission was to isolate the evacuated area, was organized to cope with the threat of disobedience. Reserve units – the most vulnerable to political influence because of their exposure to civilian values – were completely excluded from the mission. Even more significant was the distancing of units with a high percentage of religious conscripts from inner-circle missions. Similarly, the homogenous ultra-Orthodox battalion was exempted from participating in the evacuation from the outset, on the assumption that it bore a high potential for disobedience. At the same time, the IDF efficiently handled soldiers who announced their intentions to refuse, relieving such soldiers of their duties without penalizing them (Levy, 2007, 181-212). Exclusion of religious soldiers resulted not only from goodwill or threats of disobedience, but also from understandings between the IDF and leading rabbis (Bick, 2007, 320).

A similar policy of distancing religious soldiers from the inner circle of forces deployed to physically evict settlers was implemented in the West Bank as well, during the evacuation of illegal outposts after the disengagement from Gaza (Minka-Brand, 2011, 47-49). This is a clear indication how control from within affects
deployment. However, several cases of refusal or threats to refuse, which occurred in 2007-2009, deterred the army. Concerns about mass disobedience and internal rifts guided the IDF's inclination to leave the front-line job of evacuating outposts to police units specializing in crowd control, although it was clear that the police could not do it alone. This position, therefore, was among the obstacles preventing the government from dismantling illegal settlements, despite the Israeli pledge to the United States (Levy, 2011).

It is worth emphasizing that control from within should be distinguished from protest. In control from within, soldiers do not simply protest outside the military and let the government handle their demands (as often happened when reserve soldiers rallied after completing their service). Rather, the soldiers enter the political-military hierarchy in order to influence the policy by bargaining, dissenting, interacting with commanders and peers, and mobilizing political support.

Furthermore, control from within should be distinguished from other forms of "direct" control, as conceptualized by Levy and Michael (2011). Within the confines of the latter, agents such as civil rights groups, as well as rabbis (as in the cases discussed above) work outside the military to monitor its activities. In a different manner, captured within the concept of "control from within" is a situation in which soldiers work from within by themselves, or react to external encouragements, such as in the case of religious soldiers in the IDF. To a large extent, a dual system of bargaining takes place with mutual reinforcements. As can be seen in the disengagement from Gaza, soldiers bargained with their commanders as to their part in the mission to evacuate settlers, while rabbis simultaneously negotiated with the military command and the political leadership over this mission. Rabbis were encouraged by the soldiers' needs, encouraged the soldiers to voice their needs (even
helping them construct the needs) and surely reinforced the soldiers' bargaining power.

2. Diachronic Control

Unlike synchronic control, which involves intervention in real time, diachronic control aims at documenting information after the mission has taken place, in order to influence policies. The organization Breaking the Silence (BtS) demonstrates this mode of control.

In the summer of 2004, during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, BtS appeared on the public scene. This was an organization of released conscripts who presented a photography exhibition in Tel Aviv, incorporating testimonies concerning the abuse of Palestinians. Following the public storm that this exhibition aroused, the BtS' project of documentation was expanded and the media began to flood their outlets with information on violent behavior, while the IDF rushed to declare that all alleged cases of misconduct would be investigated. As a result, a range of incidents were brought to light, including looting and destruction, various methods of punishing civilians, humiliating experiences at checkpoints, improper shooting practices, etc.

Nevertheless, the late arrival of BtS, four years after violent conflict with the Palestinians had actually commenced, is an indication that a long period was necessary for a critical mass to be formed to document and report misbehavior, and until the media became more open to criticizing the government (Breaking the Silence website). Under such conditions, synchronic control could not easily emerge, and was therefore supplanted by the diachronic mode.

The weakness of the synchronous mode of control from within is well-shown in BtS' testimonies. During the years 2000-2010, the organization interviewed more than
700 soldiers and veterans about their experiences serving in the occupied territories (Breaking the Silence, 2010). However, what is striking in these data is that, although the witnesses display sensitivity post factum, almost none had done anything in real time, such as attempting to restrain other soldiers in the unit. Synchronic control is ineffective when practiced by individual soldiers and often requires a critical mass of soldiers. These sensitive testifiers practically indicated the loss of a critical mass of soldiers at the level of a unit; soldiers who could have acted together in real time by exercising synchronic control. A sense of loneliness and isolation is manifested in these testimonies.

For example, a soldier from the armored corps explained why he had remained silent when he saw his peers hitting a bound Palestinian detainee. He said:

Really there isn’t much to do. Especially when it’s officers and you are a soldier in the tank corps who they wouldn’t even piss on, so what? You’ll get into a fight? You’ll stop them? You’ll bother them? You can’t disrupt the company unity or the group dynamic, you can’t come and fight people during. Now it wouldn’t happen. I wouldn’t allow it to happen, but that’s not a big deal because I’m a reservist (p. 46).

Another soldier, a paratrooper, explained why he could do nothing to stop his friends from unchecked throwing of stun grenades at children stoning the soldiers' vehicle:

.. in the company I’m in the minority. In a platoon of nine people, we were three against behaving like retarded kids every time you enter the city and throw stun grenades… (p. 112).
An even more problematic picture is portrayed in the testimonies of women who served as combatants. Some women soldiers tried to overcome their marginal status vis-à-vis their male peers by practicing even more violence than the male soldiers. Many of the women testified that they were encouraged by the male soldiers to use extreme violence against the Palestinians. When they attempted to restrain the male soldiers, they felt humiliated (Sasson-Levy, Levy & Lomsky-Feder, 2011).

Another indication of the effect of the reduction in the critical mass of conscientious soldiers was illustrated by the testimony of one of the leaders of Courage to Refuse, a movement based on selectively refusing to serve in the West Bank and Gaza, which emerged in 2002 during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The officer described what happened in his company after he and his friends had left it because of their refusal to serve (Lavie, 2002):

I was sitting with a group of 10 combat platoon commanders…They told me that because we refused to serve during the past year [2002], we have no idea what's happening there, that it's an entirely new ballgame now. They described the horrors that were committed in their units – looting, abuse, you name it. Everything but rape. The experiences that caused us to come out with the letter [calling for refusal] pale in comparison to this.

The overall loss of the critical mass of more conscientious soldiers reflects the realignment of the social composition of the field units, as mentioned above. It is not that the new groups who have increasingly staffed combat roles have an inherent propensity to aggressiveness. However, these groups are more nationalistic and conservative, given the correlation between political outlook and ethno-class location, and therefore treat the use of force somewhat more lightly (Bar-Tal & Klonimus, 2011). They see their military service as a springboard for mobility, and hence have
an interest in an aggressive army that will elevate the military's status, and by extension, their own. Furthermore, these groups' struggles for social recognition within their communities, the military, and in the general civilian sphere, make the soldiers overly-motivated to fight and prove their ability in relation to other groups. Such a tendency is often translated into aggressiveness (Levy, 2007, 134-138).

To the impact of social realignment one has to add the high profile of legitimacy to use force during the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the freedom of operation with which the supreme command entrusted the field units. All in all, the result was a heightening of barriers to any real-time resistance to military aggressiveness. Diachronic control thus became the most available tool.

A similar effect was caused by the removal of reservists from friction zones. The first Lebanon War laid bare the political collapse of the model of a middle class-based reserve army, as reservists took part in antiwar protest organizations. Protest in, and out, of uniform contributed to the fracturing of the army’s professional autonomy. The lesson that had been learned was implemented in Lebanon from 1985-2000, during which Israel fought a guerrilla war against Hezbollah forces in the security zone occupied by Israel in the southern part of Lebanon. There, the fighting was increasingly carried out by the conscript army. One of the senior field officers in Lebanon testified that relying on regular conscripts meant that warfare could be managed far from the public’s consciousness and free from public criticism (Tamir, 2005, 10-11, 274). In other words, removal of reservists further shrunk the infrastructure for both synchronic and diachronic control from within.

In sum, a transition was developed from synchronic to diachronic modes of control from within, exercised by soldiers from the left-center political wing. Rightist soldiers, however, could effectively utilize more synchronic forms of control. This
general conclusion helps us formulate the conditions under which control from within is developed.

**Determinants of Control**

Albert Hirschman's classic work, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970), on how people respond to dissatisfaction with organizations, offers suitable tools to deal with conditions encouraging control from within. If one follows Hirschman's view, one can argue that soldiers can choose between four responses when they are dissatisfied with the military's performance.

1. **Loyalty – Obedience** out of identification with, and support of, the organization and its policies.

2. **Neglect – A** passive approach that typifies the silent majority, expressed through alienation, cynicism, apathy, distrust and more ('neglect' was offered by Lyons & Lower, 1986, following Hirschman).

3. **Exit – Draft avoidance, desertion, or to some degree, also explicit disobedience.**

4. **Voice – A**n attempt to influence the functioning of the military by exercising control from within.

Unlike the responses of consumers on which Hirschman focused, the hierarchical nature of the military constrains the main options of soldiers to neglect, loyalty and voice. Exit, however, is more of an option in a voluntary force than in a conscript military.

In these terms, conscientious objection is a combination of voice and exit. Objectors, especially selective refuseniks, strive not only to exit the mission but also voice their objection to the policies guiding the mission, in an attempt to influence public opinion, decisionmakers, and other enlistees (including potential ones).
Selective refusal is thus a pattern of "exit vociferously" (see Laver, 1976). In a different way, gray refusal is a silent, internal exit from the mission. However, from the perspective of the military command, gray refusal is a pattern of voice, an expression of dissatisfaction with the military's functioning. Both forms of refusal can be termed as quasi-exit (in the concept offered by Lehman-Wilzig, 1991). Draft avoidance is a typical exit, as the potential enlistee is "breaking the rules" and thereby exiting from the formal framework. Unlike a potential draftee, a choice made by a young man or woman not to join the volunteer army has nothing to do with Hirschman's concepts, unless it is a kind of "foot voting" against an ideological background, and thereby a form of voice.

Offering specific sources of dissatisfaction with the military mission is beyond the scope of this study. They may arise from an ethical background or from the conditions – specified by students of the casualty sensitivity syndrome – which heighten such sensitivity, another form of dissatisfaction. Among these conditions: (1) the mission is portrayed as unsuccessfully attaining its original goals, or its rightness is questioned (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2009); (2) the mission is portrayed as worthless for eliminating an external threat (Jentleson & Britton, 1998); (3) an increasing log of cumulative casualties (Mueller, 2005); (4) a mounting dissensus among the elites, which affects the public attitude to the mission (Larson, 1996, 75–97).

Control from within is likely to emerge when an atmosphere encouraging criticism of the military mission encounters the determinants specified below. The choice between these patterns of response to dissatisfaction is yielded by the interplay of two variables: the level of presence of soldiers belonging to the same social group, and the group's social status within and outside the military.

Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical argument and the situations it produces.
Figure 1: Determinants of Soldiers’ Responses

Synchronic control from within is developed under two conditions:

1. A critical mass of soldiers is created within the company (or comparable small unit) who share common experiences. They interpret an episode as a wrong course of action, and are motivated to work together to do what is deemed necessary to repair it. Belonging to the same social group may further facilitate such bonding.

In most cases, effective synchronic control embodies a form of collective action within the military. Therefore, critical mass is a key condition for the initiation and sustenance of such an action. In comparison to the exit option, voice is costly and conditioned on the influence and bargaining power of the organization members (Hirschman, 1970, 40). The cost of voice is much higher in a hierarchical organization such as the military, especially when conscription is in force. A shared social location increases the density of a social network. When density increases, agents communicate more intensively, share information, develop similar worldviews, and become more inured to calls for them to defect from the cause (Kim & Bearman, 1997).
2. The group establishes its social status within, and especially outside, the military. Social status matters in three ways:

(1) Social status in the military is highly correlated with investment in the organization, for example: combat achievements, long-term sacrifice and established arrangements respecting the special status of the group, often anchored in diversity management. The higher the investment, the greater the propensity to protect it, by clinging either to voice as a means to limit inconsistencies between the soldier's expectations from the military mission and the practical directives, or loyalty (this argument is drawn on Dowding & John, 2008, 294; Lyons & Lower, 1986, 333).

(2) Social status is highly correlated with the availability of good alternatives outside the military. Young people drawn from powerful social groups which staff the armed forces may be able to embark on alternative mobility tracks instead of the demanding military service. That is, provided they can negotiate their terms of service with the military. The more the military employs selective recruitment, even within the confines of conscription, the more likely is the pursuit of alternatives. Such availability increases the likelihood that soldiers will react strongly to any dissatisfaction, either by voice or exit (Lyons & Lower, 1986, 333-334). Hence, availability of alternatives increases the group's bargaining power when it chooses voice, i.e., synchronic control, and thus further solidifies this initial choice over exit, as long as the bargaining works for the group's benefit. Voice encourages the command to act to curtail the option of exit or a louder voice (Laver, 1976). Small wonder that the military often tolerates gray refusal in order to contain explicit refusal or louder patterns of dissidence.

(3) Higher social status is correlated with a greater ability to adopt a critical attitude in general (Dowding & John, 2008, 294), and hence also towards orders that
generate immoral behavior in the military, in particular. In families from a lower socio-economic level, one is more likely to grow up with the awareness of being at the mercy of the hegemony, which leads to keeping a low profile, and the compliance patterns that this entails (Libes & Blum-Kulka, 1994). After all, voice, which challenges the military command, exposes the group to symbolic, if not material, sanctions, and therefore, social status enhances the group's courage to face pressures.

All in all, the cumulative impact of these variables would be a tilt towards synchronic control. Against this background, different groups' motivations for military sacrifice are largely derived from investment, alternatives, and general attitudes – the variables cited above – in addition to the role played by purely patriotic sentiments that the groups import from the civilian sphere. In the end, the variables cited here contextualize, and thus reinforce or weaken, pervious sentiments.

It is not for nothing that synchronic control has emerged from religious groups only since the 1990s, when these groups felt strong enough, in the military and civilian realms alike, to challenge the secular dominance in military culture. Not only has the military increased its dependence on the religious manpower reservoir, but it also became concerned that the religious leadership (mainly rabbis in this case) can encourage religious graduates of Orthodox high schools and yeshivas to opt for noncombatant tracks or to utilize the option for exemption from service which is currently available to yeshiva graduates in Israel, (taking advantage of the historic deal exempting ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students from the military). Concurrently, the group's organizational investment, by which it established its image as the new service elite and benefited from special arrangements respecting religious diversity, tipped the scale towards opting for voice rather than exit. These conditions encouraged obedience or gray refusal during the disengagement, rather than explicit
disobedience – an exit which could have endangered the groups' gains in the military (Levy, 2007, 181-212).

Similarly, after the secular middle-class had established it militarily-based dominance, with the 1967 Six-Day War as the main watershed, soldiers began to display more sensitivity and criticism toward their missions. Subversiveness increased since the 1980s, when the group partly distanced itself from the military and developed alternative tracks of mobility. For this group, the military became less essential as an arena in which to manifest its achievements and justify its social gains in the civilian sphere (Levy, 2007).

A combination of high status, but limited presence in the military, yields diachronic control and even exit, such as draft dodging or refusal. In other words, the availability of good alternatives outside the military, together with a critical attitude, but also a lack of critical mass in the ranks, may discourage collective action inside the military in terms of synchronic control. Exit is more of an option in a volunteer force, but less so in a conscript military, especially at the group level, because of its cost. When such costs are reinforced by past investments in the military, collective action in the diachronic control mode then becomes more viable. Often, powerful groups can compensate for their insufficient presence in the combat ranks by joining with other like-minded peers and creating a virtual critical mass outside the military. BtS exemplified this pattern, naturally leading to (diachronic) patterns of documentation rather than synchronic action.

BtS resembles the American petition entitled An Appeal for Redress from the War in Iraq, signed in 2007 by approximately 2000 soldiers and submitted to Congress. “Implicit in the appeal,” claimed Andrew Bacevich (2007), “is the suggestion that national-security policies somehow require the consent of those in uniform.” In other
words, even in a vocational military, soldiers turned to collective action, in a form combining synchronic and diachronic patterns of control, instead of opting out. Their investment in the military tipped the scale for voice rather than exit.

When high presence is paired with lower social status, loyalty becomes the favorite choice, as typified by minority groups with high presence in the ranks. A dissident collective action such as mass desertion or even group revolt can appear. However, these actions have nothing to do with civilian control, as the soldiers intend to protect themselves against external vulnerabilities such as denial of rights.

Obviously, low scores in both presence and status generate loyalty or neglect. Such was the case of women combatants, as indicated by their testimonies to BtS. It was especially so, as the few who eventually testified were encouraged by an initiative coming from the male leadership of the organization, so most women opted for neglect or loyalty.

Conclusions

Civilian control, asserts historian Richard Kohn, "allows a nation to base its values, institutions, and practices on the popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders, whose outlook, by definition, focuses on the need for internal order and external security" (1997, 141). This requirement prescribes "activation" of the popular will, by stimulating debate on the use of force and military deployment to this end. Without debate, the popular will may stagnate and the military's autonomy and that of its political supervisors to interpret this will may increase.

Control from within may enhance the activation of the popular will. The forms of control from within presented above have in common their potential to provoke debates on military affairs by resistance, leaking, and documentation, among other
means. Their value cannot be underestimated when mass armies decline in industrialized democracies and hence also the stake of citizens in shaping military policies. An awakening of the public conscience demands more tools, to which control from within may be instrumental.

Notwithstanding the merit of control from within, this article addressed gaps in the literature dealing with the role of the recruitment model in shaping civilian control. Concerned by these gaps, the article offered a pilot study using the case of Israel to conceptualize control from within and its determinants.

Three scholarly gaps were mapped. First was the lack of a thorough analysis of the linkage between the social composition of the military and civilian control, apart from the impact of the presence of elites vis-à-vis lower social groups in the ranks. A partial analysis of this aspect has been offered here. Different social groups exercise different patterns of control from within, from the choices depicted in Figure 1. Social status and presence, the variables determining the choices, are varied by social groups. Empirically, this article identified differences between the secular middle-class and religious groups but the theoretical framework is applicable to other cases as well. Distinction between elites and lower-class groups cannot capture the entire social and cultural mosaic that has emerged in post-modern militaries.

Filling the second gap, the article analyzed informal patterns of civilian control; in this case, control emerging from the ranks. In general, as Levy and Michael (2011) have already argued, extra-institutional players affect the military’s space of bargaining vis-à-vis politicians, by setting limits on the institutional encounter between the politicians and the officers. In the end, civilian control is about the ability of the citizenry to limit civilians' autonomy to activate the military, and to limit the military's autonomy in the areas of activity that have political implications. What is
important, is not the institutional, formal arrangements of control or the encounter between the government and the military, but the citizenry's ability to set limits on its government. Control over the military should be seen as a process rather than a formal and institutional arrangement or outcome. What matters here are the mechanisms affecting the military's space of autonomous operation, and not whether those mechanisms have formal expressions.

As presented here, soldiers control the military from within by employing a variety of actions through which they strive to set limits on the autonomy of their commanders to deploy troops. Their actions are effective, especially when they signal limitations from the "bottom-up" to the chain of command, and through it to the civilian supervisors of the military. When civilians modify their directives – the most significant case in this study being the refrain from deploying the military to evacuate illegal settlements in the West Bank – civilian control works. More important than the identity of the involved actors, is the process and the potential outcome. In other words, civilian control is civilian control when the government deploys the military according to what it reads as changes in public opinion and domestic political pressures, or according to what it reads as pressures exerted from soldiers on the ground. It is especially so when soldiers take part in modifying public opinion, for example, by delegitimizing policies through dissenting actions.

Here, the article advances on the work of Ruffa, Dandeker and Vennesson (2013). According to their argument, with which I agree, tactical level affects politics. However, I offer an analysis demonstrating that influence may stem from a politically intentional act, and specify the determinants of choices made by soldiers. Furthermore, by linking actions to their political impact, I further connect actions emerging from the tactical level to civilian control.
The dialogue with Ruffa et al indicates the relevancy of this study to vocational armies as well. True, it is more likely that soldiers whose agendas contradict the formal policies to which the military is submitted would opt out from the service rather than initiate collective action inside the organization. However, as soldiers may make tactical or operational decisions that have political repercussions or affect the functioning of the military, as Ruffa et al maintained, they may also do it intentionally. After all, political agendas may come and go faster than the social-political realignment of the ranks, and thereby trigger resistance on the ground. For example, although ideologically-motivated refusal is less common in volunteer forces, some cases occurred during the Iraq War and could have helped delegitimize the war (Deichert, 2010, 94-96). *An Appeal for Redress from the War in Iraq* is another case.

This article addresses a third gap: the linkage between the recruitment model and the dynamic of military policies. This study analyzes the way the field command implements political directives. Important here is the way soldiers can create a momentum of their own, an unintended dynamic, which can shape a new reality and even generate escalation/de-escalation. Manpower policies affect the propensity to use force. As this study demonstrated, however, this propensity can emerge from the "bottom-up." Focus on the decisionmaking level is therefore insufficient for the understanding of military policies.

"Bottom-up" pressures, in the form of disobedience, prompted the Israeli government to withdraw troops from Gaza in 2005, thus generating (temporary) de-escalation. Likewise, the reality of illegal settlements and the limited ability to evacuate them aggravated tensions in the West Bank, laying the foundation for a new round of hostilities. Here again, soldiers may reshape the encounter between officers and civilians and constrain their decisionmaking. Indeed, the manpower system
affects military policies by affecting the social makeup of the ranks with the ideological biases that this entails. However, "bottom-up" signals go beyond the "black box" of the officer-civilian dialogue on which the research has traditionally focused.

Finally, it should be noted that control from within can be as constructive, as destructive, to civilian control. It is constructive when soldiers expose misbehavior, expose deviations from formal policies, or highlight issues that can promote policy debates. However, control from within can be also destructive when, rather than promoting the perfection of the popular will, it thwarts this will. Such is the case when the implementation of widely politically agreed-upon policies is subject to the will of a group of soldiers, whose agenda may not conform to the popular will. Here we have another reason why students of civilian control should address informal mechanisms of civilian control, although recommendations of how to balance the impact of such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this article.

Regarding this point, the reader may be persuaded as to why control from within matters. Building on this pilot study, a future study should expand its comparative context, with particular focus on the differences between conscript and voluntary armies.

References


Websites