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From Republican to Market Control over the Armed Forces: A Conceptual Framework*

Yagil Levy
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

This article claims that types of reward systems that form the mechanism of military recruitment affect types of civilian control over the military. Specifically, the alteration of the reward system from institution/symbolic to occupation/material modes has changed the mode of civilian control from republican to market control. Market control has supplanted the historical citizen-soldier model of civilian control, by which the political community supervised the military through the social groups serving in it and their social networks. Market control is characterized by the market-oriented monitoring of military activity, which is mainly focused on the military resources and the commodification of military service, which produced the market regulation of recruitment. This has a contradictory effect on the army's freedom of action: while the military is given greater leeway in administering belligerent policies, it has fewer resources with which to fund them.
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Yagil Levy *teaches in the Department of Public Policy and Administration and the Division of Military and Security at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His current research interests include the theoretical aspects of society–military relations and the linkage between Israel's war/peace policies and the social structure of the military. His recent books include* Israel's Materialist Militarism *and* Israel Since 1980 *(with Guy Ben-Porat* et al.*). He can be reached at* yagil@bgumail.bgu.ac.il.

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Introduction

Military recruitment mechanisms have significantly changed in most Western democracies, with the gradual phasing out of the draft since the 1970s in favor of volunteer forces. By altering the reward system that forms the basis for recruitment, the shift to volunteer forces has had a major, though neglected, impact on the capacity for democratic civilian control of the military. As a point of departure, Charles Moskos argues that the military has made a transition "from institution to occupation," that is, from an institution that is legitimated in terms of values and norms, to an occupation that is legitimated in terms of the marketplace.[1]

Segal and Woodruff *et al.* build on Moskos's argument by analyzing institution/occupation as separate dimensions, simultaneously subsumed as organizing norms within the military organization.[2] I have pushed the argument one step further by suggesting that institution/occupation may simultaneously serve as motivating variables that mutually affect one another and can thus be conceptually broadened to the distinction between symbolic and material rewards, respectively.[3] These and other writers have linked the changes in norms, motivations, and rewards to the transition from drafted to vocational armies.

At the same time, this structural transition, with the decreased reliance on upper-middle class groups it has entailed, has left elite groups more indifferent to military affairs and thereby weakened political supervision of the military.[4] This assessment has led to calls to restore the draft system, or at least to institute more equitable forms of recruitment.[5]

Nonetheless, although both processes occur in parallel, scholars have not related the altered reward system from institution/symbolic to occupation/material to dynamics in civilian control of the military. This conceptual puzzle is mirrored in empirical problems. For example, the relatively broad autonomy

1. Charles Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces & Society* 4 (Fall 1977): 41–50.

2. David R. Segal, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis," *Armed Forces & Society* 1 (Spring 1986): 351–76; Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David R. Segal, "Propensity to Serve and Motivation to Enlist among American Combat Soldiers," *Armed Forces and Society* 32 (April 2006): 353–66.

3. Yagil Levy, "Soldiers as Laborers: A Theoretical Model," *Theory and Society* 36 (April 2007): 187–208.

4. See for example: Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap between the Military and Society," *Atlantic Monthly* 280 (July 1997): 66–78; Joseph Paul Vasquez, "Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (December 2005): 849–73.

5. For example, Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Failure of an All-Volunteer Military," *Boston Globe*, January 21, 2007.

enjoyed by the U.S. administration in running its military policies in Iraq despite considerable domestic opposition invites closer inspection of the structural changes affecting civilian control of the armed forces beyond the shift to an all-volunteer force (AVF). After all, the very transition to an AVF was itself reflective of a deeper social change. In fact, the traditional link between soldiering and citizenship had eroded long before the formal abolition of the draft, a rupture accompanied by a growing disinclination on the part of the upper-middle class to make sacrifices for the sake of the military. In other words, the mode of recruitment does not tell the whole story. It should therefore be seen as a dependent, rather than independent, variable.

This article focuses on these neglected relations. It argues that types of reward systems affect types of civilian control over the military. Specifically, the very move from symbolic- to material-based recruitment has changed the mode of civilian control from *republican* to *market control*. Market control has supplanted the historical citizen-soldier model of civilian control by which the political community supervised the military through the social groups serving in it and their social networks. Market control is characterized by the market-oriented monitoring of military activity (a result of changes in the army's social composition), and the commodification of military service, which produced the market regulation of recruitment. This has a contradictory effect on the army's freedom of action: while the military is given greater leeway in administering belligerent policies, it has fewer resources with which to support them. Thus, the issue is not only the transition from drafted to vocational armies (as discussed since Tocqueville and Machiavelli), but rather the broader role of the market in controlling the military.

Methodologically, this study draws mainly from the experiences of the U.S. Army. The U.S. is uniquely a democracy at war as well as a strong market society, and as such it constitutes a *prototypical form*. In other words, it is not necessarily a representative case but it is expected to become so, a forerunner of trends that offers opportunities for drawing lessons.[6] As might be expected, the Iraq War offers the main empirical template on which the facets of market control can be tested. This is not to claim that the framework described below is already being applied in other Western democracies, but rather that it may become the model for other democratic nations that deploy their militaries. For instance, the Israeli case shows similar signs of change, but in Israel the draft system is still strong.[7] This article should thus be read as laying out a conceptual framework.

6. Richard Rose and W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis," *Political Studies* 39 (September 1991): 446–62.

7. Yagil Levy, "The Second Lebanon War: From Republican Control to Market Control over the Army," *Democracy and Security* 4 (March 2008): 48–68.

The Reward System: Symbolic versus Material Rewards

Armies always reward soldiers in ways that are valuable in civilian life. Soldiers figure in two coexistent reward systems: (1) *material rewards*, which are essentially monetary and mostly immediate rewards, such as payments, pensions, job training, housing, financial aid for higher education; and (2) *symbolic rewards*, which stem from different levels of prestige and honor accruing to military service. While material rewards with monetary value are easily deployable outside the military, the value of symbolic rewards in civilian society depends on the social context into which they are introduced. In general, the honor and prestige enjoyed by soldiers matter to the extent that they are socially recognized in the civic sphere in a manner that provides them with symbolic rewards.

Rights allocation is the primary form of symbolic resources. Scholars agree that military service has historically shaped the criteria for citizenship and other rights, and has hence been one of their hallmarks. Members of groups that had not been attributed with full citizenship could improve their social standing by performing military service.[8] Even prior to the allocation of formal rights, the recruits' very belief that they were serving the nation was a symbolic reward in itself. Working class groups, ethnic minorities, and gradually women and homosexuals have all effectively utilized military service as a mechanism for social mobility. Furthermore, insofar as battlefield achievements were crucial for determining social status, as seen in the marginalization of women and ethnic minorities, social hierarchies were transferred from the military to the civilian sphere and vice versa.

Symbolic rewards can be tied to the level of external threat, that is, the state's capacity to artificially increase the demand for its protection services by exaggerating external threats.[9] Other forms of reward include the acquisition of social capital during and owing to military experience, and the impacts this has on occupational choice.[10]

Symbolic rewards are thus convertible to material rewards, such as social rights accruing to ex-soldiers or advantages in attaining certain jobs. However, different kinds of reward are at work: while material rewards are directly

8. James Burk, "Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious Objectors," *Armed Forces & Society* 21 (Summer 1995): 503–29; Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (Fall 1976): 185–203.

9. David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86 (March 1992): 24–37.

10. Dennis DeTray, "Veteran Status as a Screening Device," *American Economic Review* 72 (March 1982): 133–42; Jay Teachman, "Military Service during the Vietnam Era: Were There Consequences for Subsequent Civilian Earnings?" *Social Forces* 83 (December 2004): 709–30.

provided to servicepersons within the military organization (first and foremost as salaries), symbolic rewards change their form and produce a material component only outside the military. Against this background, the motivating power of symbolic rewards is best measured in terms of their convertibility—their conversion from military resources to valuable social resources—rather than their discursive face value.

Historically, the legitimization of war and war preparation rested on rewarding not only the recruits themselves, but also, and often primarily, the social groups that yielded their children to military service. To some extent, the greater the symbolic resources accrued by groups through military service, the more willing they were to sacrifice human and material resources for war preparations and war itself. This, of course, impacted on the level of societal militarism.[11] Symbolic rewards were thus the main driving force behind popular militarism, and as such were more valuable than material rewards.

Given that the Gordian knot that ties soldiering to citizenship means that the main benefit for enlistees is access to multiple social rights, the analysis offered in this article is mainly applicable to enlisted personnel. After all, the main turning points in the history of recruitment—from the citizen-soldier of the 1800s to the draft crisis of the 1970s—resulted from attitudes among the citizenry (and potential enlistees) rather than the officership.

The Shift in the Reward System

Symbolic and material modes of reward are mutually related and partially dependent on one another. Nowadays, declines in symbolic rewards are leading to an increase in material rewards, unlike the prevailing trend in the era of state formation. In that period, the state required mass armies to deal with perceived external threats and thus relied on symbolic rewards, central to which was the linkage between military service and rights allocation.

Increased symbolic rewards lowered expectations for material rewards. Coming from social groups with meager access to the state's power, recruits tended to accept minimal material rewards in exchange for greater symbolic worth. Serving the nation was relatively more important than economic incentives.[12] This was particularly the case when symbolic rewards were translatable into material rewards in the shape of social rights. A mechanism of

11. Levy, "Soldiers as Laborers."

12. James Burk, "The Military Obligation of Citizens since Vietnam," *Parameters* 31 (Summer 2001): 48–60.

recruitment driven by nationalism supplanted one propelled by the market, and so the end of mercenarism (typified by soldiers who were poorly rewarded in the symbolic realm) saw a decrease in material rewards. Furthermore, not only did high symbolic rewards compensate for low monetary rewards, the former were made conditional on the latter: the notion that they were following a calling meant that servicepersons came to be perceived as making a sacrifice, which enhanced their standing in society and in turn justified their privileges.

This situation reached its zenith during World War II, following which the two forms of reward then simultaneously moved in opposite directions, as post-Cold War militaries became professional-vocational forces, thereby losing much of their symbolic merit. How should we account for this downturn in the relative value of symbolic rewards?

Historically, it may be related to the decline in convertibility that has been eroding the social status of Western militaries since World War II. Several factors have driven this process: (1) the intergenerational value shift in the 1970s–1990s in the U.S. and other Western democracies from materialist values, which prioritized economic and physical security, to postmaterialist values, which stress belonging and self-expression;[13] (2) the demise of the traditional role of the citizen-soldier following technologization and nuclear armament, processes that decreased the military participation ratio;[14] (3) the expansion of (gradually reduced) welfare rights entirely unrelated to military service, along with the market-driven empowerment of the middle class by means of its declining dependency on the state allocation of rights;[15] and (4) the contribution of increased selectivity in recruitment policies. Selective recruitment meant that veterans would have to compete with growing numbers of highly qualified non-veterans, who could take advantage of their exemption by getting a head start in the labor market, thereby causing veterans' earnings to decrease relative

13. Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and Postmodern Values," *The Washington Quarterly* 23 (January 2000): 215–28.

14. Bryan S. Turner, "The Erosion of Citizenship," *British Journal of Sociology* 52 (June 2001): 189–209.

15. Rafael Ajangiz, *Being Influential Without Participating in the Policy Process: The Case of Conscription in Western Europe* (European Consortium for Political Research, 2001, http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/vents/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws20/ajangiz.PDF), 3–4; Burk, "Citizenship Status"; Maury D. Feld, *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977); Charles C. Moskos, "What Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective," *Parameters* 31 (Summer 2001): 29–47. As Moskos claimed, "one major obstacle in recruitment. . .[is] the substantial federal aid given to college students who do not serve their country. We now spend annually over $20 billion in grants and loan subsidies to college students. We have, in effect, created a G.I. Bill without the G.I.," 42.

to non-veterans.[16] Furthermore, selectivity also makes military service more inequitable, and as such less legitimate.[17]

When symbolic rewards decline, pressure mounts either to increase material rewards, or, alternatively, to reduce the length of military service and cut back social investments in security. Furthermore, servicepersons lose part of their capacity to convert their military contribution into valuable benefits and professional assets after their release. As a result, they demand monetary compensation. Meanwhile, the military has to work ever harder to re-attract skilled manpower. In turn, an increased reliance on material rewards frequently devalues symbolic rewards, as it subverts the image of soldiers as bearing the weight of national missions and portrays them as working in a rewarding occupation instead.

Draft systems in most Western states thus experienced a crisis that has led governments since the 1970s to shift military recruitment from administrative to market regulation. In other words, they phased out conscription (as well as becoming more reliant on technology, as detailed below). Not only has soldiering gradually come to be regulated by the market, but supplementary military services are also increasingly supplied by private companies, including the revival of mercenarism in several conflict areas in the world.

Increased reliance on material rewards embodies what Moskos has termed the global transition "from institution to occupation."[18] An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, with remuneration determined by the laws of supply and demand. When military service becomes an occupation, recruits are motivated by self-interest rather than the organization's interest, and material compensation is paramount. In short, rather than a calling, being a soldier is merely a job, and as such attracts fewer symbolic rewards.

Nevertheless, because of budgetary barriers, states could not increase servicepersons' earnings limitlessly, despite the need to constantly adjust the military compensation system to the cyclical demands for skilled manpower in the labor market. Against this background, states accompanied the transition to a volunteer force with a decrease in labor costs by hiring low-income employees,

16. See for example: Joshua D. Angrist, "Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records," *American Economic Review* 80 (June 1990): 313–36. As Angrist shows, for nearly ten years after entering the labor market, white veterans of the Vietnam War earned about 15 percent less than their non-veteran counterparts. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that a primary consequence of their military service was a loss of civilian work experience.

17. In the terms of Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

18. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation."

that is, by drawing the bulk of its personnel from the more skillful among the lower-middle class, women, and ethnic minorities. Thus, the social composition of Western armies was being altered.

The decline in symbolic rewards weakened the motivation of upper-middle class groups to serve. By the same token, however, lower class groups have been increasingly drawn to join the military, erasing their traditional under-representation in the ranks. This social realignment was carried out by creating a sense that soldiering is somehow integral to the masculine identity of men from certain racial and ethnic groups, who come to see military service as a unique mechanism for "first-class citizenship" and career opportunities.[19] These groups were thus attracted by the same symbolic rewards that had been rendered obsolete for more privileged groups. Furthermore, because this process laid the foundations for the allocation of substantive social rights, or at least the expectation of them, the state could now provide monetary compensation at a level that matched these groups' expectations. At the same time, the decline in social welfare benefits and the disappearance of union jobs—another product of the market society—made it much easier for governments to recruit volunteers from the ranks of the working class.[20] Market regulation, therefore, breeds the peripheralization of the armed forces.

To illustrate, as data regarding the U.S. Army show, the generous GI Bill (after the Korean War) was replaced by the less generous VEAP (Veterans Educational Assistance Program) in the early period of the all-volunteer force (AVF).[21] Later, improvements in the program that aimed at attracting skilled manpower applied mainly to the relatively educated recruits.[22] In short, the state adapted the level of rewards to its budgetary capabilities by altering the social composition of the military. Notably, African-American representation in the army increased from about 18 percent to around 27 percent in the years 1975–2001, while Hispanic representation increased from about 2 percent to roughly 10 percent.[23] Findings related to the social profile of the U.S. AVF and the composition of those killed in Iraq (valid as of 2004) show that although the poor and under-educated have not

19. Cynthia H. Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 237.

20. See on the U.S. experience: Beverly Silver, "Labor, War and World Politics: Contemporary Dynamics in World-Historical Perspective," in *Labour and New Social Movements in a Globalizing World System*, ed. Berthold Unfried, Marcel Van der Linden, and Christine Schindler (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2004), 19–38.

21. The post-Korean GI Bill offered a maximum payment of $11,000, while the VEAP gave only $5,500.

22. Joshua D. Angrist, "The Effect of Veterans Benefits on Veterans' Education and Earnings," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 46 (July 1993): 637–52.

23. David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "America's Military Population," *Population Bulletin* 59 (December 2004): 3–26.

been bearing the burden of the war in Iraq, neither have the upper-middle class and the elites.[24]

In sum, the transition to vocational armies has involved much more than an administrative change in the recruitment model: the state retreated *vis-à-vis* the market as monetary rewards became paramount in regulating recruitment, a process that went hand-in-hand with the market-driven shrinking of the welfare state.

Characterizing Republican Control

Market regulation affected the mode of civilian control over the armed forces. Civilian control refers to the joint institutional arrangements aimed at restraining the military's capacity for autonomous action in the main areas of activity that have political implications: operational plans, weapon systems, organization, recruitment, promotion of officers, and more. Civilian control is effective when civilian state institutions are able to set limits on the military's freedom of action in a manner that corresponds to political objectives autonomously shaped by politicians, while the military abides by these civilian directives.[25]

Various debates have emerged in recent years regarding the essence of civilian control over the military, such as how to measure it or which mechanisms of control are most effective.[26] However, these debates have focused on the institutional encounter between generals and politicians. As Mills recognized long ago, this institutional encounter is bounded by its political-cultural setting.[27] In this spirit, the current article offers what Lukes terms a three-dimensional view of power; that is, it focuses not only on observable interactions but also on the power relations that affect the actors' interests and limit their choices.[28]

Although practices of control are ultimately implemented through formal, institutional channels, political participation matters, first and foremost collective action. Social groups may gain or demand access to institutional channels as a means of influencing the representative institutions that directly monitor the military, be it through the press, lobbying, or protests, such as the anti-nuclear

24. Lawrence J. Korb and Sean E. Duggan, "An All-Volunteer Army? Recruitment and its Problems," *PS, Political Science & Politics* 40 (July 2007): 467–71.

25. See Peter D. Feaver, "Civil–Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (June 1999): 211–41.

26. For examinations of these debates, see James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (Fall 2002): 7–29; Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil–Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22 (Fall 1995): 7–24.

27. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

28. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

movement in Europe or the anti-Vietnam War movement in the U.S. Republican control, then, is a type of civilian control that stems from a high volume of collective action and thus typifies democratic regimes. In contrast, those authoritarian regimes that established effective control over the army rely on formal mechanisms rather than on the republican model. Later, I will distinguish the republican type from the market type, both forms of civilian control.

During the historical phase of state building, which reached its peak in the mid-twentieth century, high levels of symbolic rewards enabled a high military participation ratio (mass armies). This laid the foundation for middle class domination of the military's ranks, which in turn implies republican-style civilian control of the army.

Republicanism embodies the principle that the people are sovereign, meaning that equal, active, and autonomous citizens must exercise self-control for the common good and the protection of their fragile liberties from destructive power.[29] Protection against arbitrary power extends to control over the most powerful, violent instrument of governance, namely, the military.

The republican style of civilian control is embodied by the historical French citizen-soldier model, by which the political community supervised the military through the social groups serving in it and the social networks from which they came (and that is without ignoring the early exclusionary impact of the citizen-soldier upon women, ethnic minorities, and other out-groups). The republican notion of the citizen-soldier thus has two major aspects, both of which champion the establishing of militias over standing or mercenary armies: soldiering as a civic virtue and soldiering as civilian control. Following Machiavelli, soldiering as a civic virtue implies that the citizen-soldier will fight to defend his home better than a full-time mercenary soldier and that he will also become a better, more active citizen due to the value he places on the state for which he fights.[30] Following Kant, soldiering as civilian control implies preventing the concentration of power in the ruler's hands by distributing arms and the costs of bearing arms among the citizenry.[31]

High levels of symbolic rewards bred republican civilian control over the army. Several mechanisms can be specified through which the reward system affected control. As we shall see later, variations in these mechanisms also affect the market type of civilian control.

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29. See Iseult Honohan, *Civic Republicanism* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

30. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War* (New York: Capo Press, 2001); see also James Burk, "The Citizen Soldier and Democratic Societies: A Comparative Analysis of America's Revolutionary and Civil Wars," *Citizenship Studies* 4 (July 2000): 149–65.

31. Elaine Scarry, "War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 139 (May 1991): 1257–1316.

First, the more the army relied on mass foundations, the more willing the state was to bargain with the groups that controlled the human and material resources needed for waging war. Military contribution was exchanged for civilian control over the military via the establishment of representative institutions. Democratization was a likely result of this bargaining, with the constitution of the republican contract based on the exchange of military obligations for civil rights.[32] Access to control over the military became in itself a kind of symbolic reward, that is, the exchange of sacrifice for political rights in the form of democratized supervision over the army. In sharp contrast, pre-modern militaries were mainly staffed by mercenaries, and thus were autonomous *vis-à-vis* the state bureaucracy.[33] This old model of market-based recruitment relied on a material contract at the individual-state level; as state-building got underway, it was supplanted by symbolic contracts at the group-state level. Interdependency was created between mass conscription and symbolic rewards that in turn was translated into civilian control.

Second, social rewards were extended to the realization of political rights (including the supervision of the military) in an indirect manner as well. As Mettler has argued, the GI Bill treated World War II veterans with dignity and respect, enhancing their motivation (including that of African-American veterans) to become active citizens by populating civic organizations promoting social change and protest.[34]

Third, beyond the bargaining described above, mass recruitment enhanced democratization in the normative dimension. Mass conscription encouraged by symbolic rewards increased citizens' perceptions that both the government and other citizens were acting fairly. Burden-sharing increased citizens' motivation to comply with conscription.[35] Democratization, which is largely based on mutual trust,[36] can once more be seen as establishing tools for civilian control.

Fourth, as the modern state linked military duties with political rights while at the same time raising a mass army, the decision to go to war became a matter of bargaining between the government and the local community, namely, those directly shouldering the burden of war and the groups of citizens that provided them for that mission. In other words, the army came to be indirectly monitored by the social networks of the very youngsters who staffed its ranks. This is why the social composition of the military plays a key role in determining the nature of its

32. Charles Tilly, *Roads from Past to Future* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 193–215.

33. Hendrik Spruyt, "The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (June 2002): 127–49.

34. Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The GI Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

35. Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*.

36. Charles Tilly, "Trust and Rule," *Theory and Society* 33 (February 2004): 1–30.

civilian control. The more closely the composition of the army reflects the diversity of the surrounding society, the more politically balanced it will be. Therefore, drafted militaries are not only a mechanism for politically mobilizing the populace, but also for politically restraining the military. Antiwar protests that spring from the ranks and their social networks, various forms of disobedience, and the leaking of information from within the ranks about the overly aggressive conduct of units, are among the tools that determine the profile of control.

As exemplified by the Vietnam War, antiwar movements tend to draw mainly from the middle class. Draft resisters played a crucial role in shifting antiwar sentiments from the margins of society to the center of American politics, with a particular impact on college students.[37] Thus, the administration's need to draw on potential opponents of the war, as prescribed by the draft system, ignited protest. Even if these dissidents ultimately evaded service, and the military drew mainly from lower classes, the social map of the potential draftees triggered bargaining between the state and social groups. Dissident activities eventually played a central role in the formulation of American foreign policy, and even policymakers admitted that they made a notable contribution to the restraint of escalation and the acceleration of troop withdrawals.[38] Collective action matters in controlling the army.

Furthermore, under Supreme Court decisions that secularized the criteria for exempting conscientious objectors in the U.S., during the Vietnam War exemption rates relative to actual inductions rose from 6 percent in 1966 to 130 percent in 1972, thus playing a decisive role in ending the draft and shortening the war.[39]

Leaked information, moreover, also played a role. For example, helicopter pilots' reports on the My Lai massacre indicate the importance of soldiers' reports. Equally important was the emergence of underground GI newspapers during the Vietnam War as a means of overcoming the lack of information among civilians about the actual state of fighting.[40]

Fifth, the more the army provided its recruits with symbolic rewards in the form of power to define the social hierarchy, the more military service was seen as attractive and the army became a contentious arena between groups over

37. Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

38. Joel Lefkowitz, "Movement Outcomes and Movement Decline: The Vietnam War and the Antiwar Movement," *New Political Science* 27 (March 2005): 1–22; Melvin Small, "Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience," *Journal of Peace Research* 24 (June 1987): 185–98.

39. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The United States: COs and the State, from Colonial Times to the Present," in *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance*, ed. Charles C. Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 23–46.

40. James Lewes, *Protest and Survive: Underground GI Newspapers during the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

Figure 1
Reward-Affected Control



access to service and the intra-military status of the serving groups. Recruitment policies thus became a matter of political bargaining which determined the military's impact on the structure of social power, as attested to by political disputes in Western democracies.[41] In turn, conditions were laid down for a more politically balanced military, with effects on the fourth mechanism described above.

In sum, the mode of rewards affects the mode of control through a number of mediating mechanisms: bargaining power, active citizenship, political trust, soldiers' protests (whether in actu or in potentia), and recruitment disputes, as shown in Figure 1.

The republican model limits the military's freedom of operation by subjecting its activities and access to resources to group-state bargaining, that is, to the need to command wide public consent. Issues of war and peace, policies of recruitment, the military's budget and more are thus politically and publicly debated.

Nevertheless, republicanism does not imply a perfect system of civilian control. First, politicians have always faced difficulties in disciplining generals. Republican control only limits the military's freedom of operation. Deviations from the code of military subjection to political supervision, or the conjoining of generals and politicians to initiate undesired activities, are not entirely preventable. However, strong republican elements may elicit resistance to belligerent policies, if not preemptively, at least reactively.

41. Elizabeth Kier, "Cultural and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security* 19 (Spring 1995): 65–93; Ronald R. Krebs. *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Second, militarism and republicanism nurture one another. It was the militarization of society that enabled and justified the administrative concentration needed to deal with mass conscription, tax collection, military production, and territorial centralization—the multiple aspects of war preparation—that in turn led to patterns of bargaining that generated democratization with republican modes of supervision over the armed forces. However, while the short-term implications of the state's military policies and its political use of its violent means have been more openly discussed, long-term, complex, and strategic implications have tended to be more obscure, sometimes even to the architects of policy themselves. A militarized discourse hampered ordinary people's ability to challenge policymakers' considerations. Cultural barriers, rather than formal institutional restraints, accounted for these limitations.[42] "Civilian control" should thus not be bound to the context of institutional, formal mechanisms, but rather be viewed three-dimensionally.

High levels of militarism could also elicit non-democratic forms of control, such as the German model of the "nation in arms." There, extremely high levels of symbolic rewards (the sense of perceived popular partnership in shaping the nation) were translated into political passivity. Still, as the republican contract that constituted such passivity had been grounded in the trade-off between loyalty to the regime and symbolic rewards (such as national pride), military failures enhanced civilian control once more by fostering trends of demilitarization with increasing accountability over the realms in which the military had previously functioned. In post-World War I Germany, for example, the same working class that had previously been mobilized in the war and used its conscription as a vehicle to full citizenship, now opposed those responsible for war.[43] The republican contract thus lays the foundations for the citizenry's response to a "breach of contract." The higher the profile of military participation by a broad spectrum of society, the greater will be the general social sensitivity to perceived breaches of contract.

Reduced symbolic rewards changed the mode of civilian control over the military. Civilian control underwent a gradual shift from the historical citizen-soldier type of republican control to what can be termed *market control over the armed forces*. Four interrelated processes then took place and shaped the patterns of market control. First, with the social alteration of the armies, middle class groups monitored the military from the outside and thus focused on the main aspect of their sacrifice, namely, military resources in a growing capital-intensive

42. See, for example, the analysis of Thomas G. Paterson, *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

43. Michael Geyer, "The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945," in *The Militarization of the Western World*, ed. John R. Gillis (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 65–102.

military, resulting in the market-oriented monitoring of military activity. Second, at the same time, the commodification of military service intensified, meaning that market-related factors increasingly came to govern military service.

Third, the impact of the social alteration and vocationalization of the military on the shift from republican to market control was augmented by a broader cultural process: the citizen-soldier has been replaced by the citizen-taxpayer, and mainly the citizen-consumer, geared to "purchase" low-cost security as part of the neo-liberal ethos of "small government." Overall, the marketization of citizenship has come about via the triumph of the market over citizenship and the recognition that the middle class can participate in the market directly without the type of mediation that typifies a mass polity.[44] This trend, which has been progressing independently of processes involving the military, enhances as much as it is enhanced by the distancing of the middle class from military service and the detachment of citizenship from soldiering. Accordingly, the ethos of New Public Management treats citizens like customers who respond primarily to economic incentives and advocates the management of administrative units in the form of business-like enterprises functioning in a market-like environment.[45] This ethos implies the retreat of substantive democracy, as the citizens' power wanes and their focus shifts from collective action to the individualized consumption of services. It also suggests the withdrawal of trust networks (such as military veterans' networks) from public politics in a manner that inhibits public voice, a process that Tilly calls de-democratization.[46]

Fourth, because of the political costs of recruiting the middle class, democracies build more capital-intensive and technologized militaries than non-democracies, and wealthy democracies use capital more intensively than poor ones. In other words, the burden for subsidizing the armed forces is shifted to the wealthiest groups, the heaviest tax payers.[47] At the same time, manpower is hired rather than conscripted, thus making labor costs an issue.

Figure 2 illustrates the causal chain leading to the empowerment of market control.

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44. Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder, and Damian Tambin, "Introduction: Dilemmas of Citizenship," in *Citizenship, Markets, and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10–11.

45. Richard C. Box, Gary S. Marshall, B.J. Reed, and Christine M. Reed, "New Public Management and Substantive Democracy," *Public Administration Review* 61 (September–October 2001): 608–19. See also Lisa A. Zanetti and Guy B. Adams, "In Service of the Leviathan: Democracy, Ethics and the Potential for Administrative Evil in the New Public Management, *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 22 (2000): 534–54.

46. Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

47. Jonathan D. Caverley, "Death and Taxes: A Rational Theory of Democratic Grand Strategy." Paper presented at the International Security Brown Bag Seminar, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, October 4, 2007.

Figure 2
The Causal Chain



Characterizing Market Control

This section characterizes the two major patterns of market control: the market-oriented monitoring of military activity and the market regulation of military service. It should be noted that this article portrays a process rather than a binary situation: market-oriented elements have always been found in the structure of civilian control, at least since World War II, while the republican model subsists even within the market environment. Therefore, we are not dealing with an either–or reality, but rather with matters of degree.

Market-Oriented Monitoring: "Body" versus "Gold" Sacrifice

As historian Bruce Porter has put it in regard to democratization led by the citizen-soldier model, "the voice of the people is heard loudest when governments require either their gold or their bodies in defense of the state."[48] However, the social realignment of the militaries generated a differential pattern of voice. Gradually, the middle class has come to protest mainly against its "gold sacrifice," that is, the monetary burden of war preparation, and has adopted a market-oriented criticism of the army that has led to military downsizing. At the same time, the bargaining power of the "body sacrificers" has declined.

The market-oriented monitoring of the military thus has several facets. The first is the voice of the "gold sacrificers." Typically, this voice is not heard through

48. Bruce D. Porter. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 10.

conventional channels of collective action. Rather, proponents of the market economy make their voice heard through direct and indirect dialogue with the state over public consumption in general and defense consumption in particular, and all in relation to the level of taxation. This dialogue defines the spectrum of resources available to the military, which in turn determines the level of its commanders' freedom and ambition.

To be sure, collective action may focus on tax reforms, such as the "tax revolt" in the U.S. in the late 1970s and early 1980s for lower state and local tax rates. However, this revolt addressed the level of taxation *per se*, while ignoring the public and social consequences of such a move, including those related to security.[49]

Importantly, following Lukes's terms, voice is not always needed. The "free market fundamentalism" with the entailed antagonism toward public expenditure has become dominant in both thought and practice since the 1970s under neoliberal wings. Thus, it became a cultural barrier prohibiting governments from increasing military expenses as well.[50] Furthermore, the growing role of stock markets in the economies means, *inter alia*, that investors signal their estimates of the likely effects of government policy.[51] Specifically, the collective reaction of international traders may serve as useful signal about what kind of outcome they expect from a diplomatic or armed contest.[52] National-security aspects are thus evaluated against the defense costs as much as the economic benefits that may offset the costs.[53]

In this spirit, economists have often debated whether military expenditure plays a critical role in maintaining low levels of unemployment and contributing to growth, or whether it is a burden on growth. The intensification of this debate since the 1970s signals the new ethos of endeavoring to rein in defense budgets.[54] Consequently, Western militaries have been functioning in a competitive political environment.

Thus, financial burdens that cannot be met either by exhausting or increasing domestic resources, mainly owing to legitimation obstacles posed by taxpayers, may affect the state's strategies for war preparation. As a result, the state may need

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49. Clarence Y. H. Lo, *Small Property versus Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

50. See David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

51. Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, "Using Markets to Inform Policy: The Case of the Iraq War", working paper (University of Pennsylvania, 2007).

52. Gerald Schneider and Vera E. Troeger, "War and the World Economy: Stock Market Reactions to International Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (October 2006): 623–45.

53. For example: William D. Nordhaus, "Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War," *The New York Review of Books* 49 (December 2002), 9–12.

54. For example: Massimo Pivetti, "Military Spending as a Burden on Growth: an 'Underconsumptionist' Critique," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 16 (December 1992): 373–84.

to shift from domestically focused strategies to what Barnett has termed *international strategy*, referring to attempts to deflect the costs of war onto foreign allies, despite the limitations that this may impose on military policies.[55] Justifying these limitations provides a stimulus for de-militarization. Market restraints laid down by the "gold sacrificers" therefore pose the main challenge to the military's freedom of operation. It is against this background that we should understand the Bush administration's deployment of a unique combination of tax cuts and massive military spending in Iraq. Whether intentionally or not, this policy ensured high levels of war legitimacy.[56]

Ultimately, for example, spending cuts played a major role in the global abolition of the conscript system in favor of all-volunteer forces. More importantly, in the absence of investment in expensive weapon systems, European states increased their reliance on the U.S. in campaigns outside Europe, and even in contingencies for war within Europe.[57] Furthermore, reductions in military spending became a global tool for easing international and regional tensions as budget pressures have acted as a kind of de facto de-militarization.[58] In sum, budget cuts driven by the market have a greater indirect effect on strategic doctrine than direct political discourse in traditional republican terms.

A second facet of market control is that the market monitoring affects the methods taken up by antiwar groups. An illustration of this is the "Opt Out Campaign" that challenges the recruitment efforts of the U.S. Government in high schools following 9/11. Antiwar activists view counter-recruitment as a way of directly and materially disrupting the supply of human resources that powers the war machine. In particular, counter-recruiters challenge the standard sales pitch made in terms of material rewards. Underlying this effort is a belief that opposition to personal military service is more effective than rallying around the traditional symbolic protest typical of the anti-draft movement during the Vietnam War.[59] Needless to say, these market-oriented modes sharply contrast with the historical political debate that directly tackled the model of conscription and that reflected concerns about the distribution of

55. Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 31–40.

56. Kostas Ifantis, "Inherent Unilateralism: Systemic Unipolarity and US Strategy," *Hellenic Studies* 12 (Spring 2004) (internet edition): http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2005/03/inherent_unilat.html.

57. John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," in *America the Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them*, ed. John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002), 33–36.

58. Hamid Davoodi, Benedict Clements, Jerald Schiff, and Peter Debaere, *Military Spending, the Peace Dividend, and Fiscal Adjustment*, IMF Working Papers 48, 2, 1999.

59. Stuart Tannock, "Is 'Opting Out' Really an Answer? Schools, Militarism, and the Counter-Recruitment Movement in Post-September 11 United States at War," *Social Justice* 32 (September 2005): 163–78.

power caused by recruitment and so demonstrated typically republican-style control.[60]

Third, having functioned in a competitive climate, militaries are more prone to develop a direct dialogue with the public, to inform debates with politicians, recruit allies, and establish legitimacy, even if this means manipulating public opinion.[61] This tendency has been amplified since the Vietnam War.[62] Direct dialogue shifted military–media relations from the military's manipulation of the media (exchanging the media's self-restriction for access to information) to a new mode in which the military now "courts" the media.[63]

This direct dialogue further weakens the traditional pattern of civilian control that negates soldiers' right to publicly disagree with their political superiors.[64] Direct dialogue weakens the political mediating mechanisms between the army's commanders and the public. Just as declining levels of collective action, as shown below, ease pressures on representative institutions, direct dialogue exacerbates this institutional demise. Furthermore, as suggested by historian Richard Kohn, the media's penetration into the military organization paradoxically undermines its monitoring capabilities: the media has more tools than ever to scrutinize the military, but the way it does so merely entrenches the supremacy of military thought. The media, he writes, have become

> less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused on profit, less professional, and more trivial . . . Issues of civilian control seem to escape the press; time after time, events or issues that in past years would have been framed or interpreted as touching upon civilian control now go unnoticed and unreported, at least in those terms.[65]

This paradox can be traced to the character of the encounter between the army and the media, in which the media's pursuit of marketable news meets the army's pursuit of legitimacy. Structurally speaking, the military's over-permeability to the media leads the press to deal with incidents while neglecting the broader picture. Ironically, if less information were available, the press would probably be more

60. See, for the example of France, Kier, "Cultural and Military Doctrine."

61. Stephen Badsey, "The Media, Strategy, and Military Culture," *Australian Army Journal* 11 (Autumn 2005): 189–202.

62. See Sam C. Sarkesian, "The U.S. Military Must Find its Voice," *Orbis* 42 (Summer 1998): 423–37.

63. Charles C. Moskos, "Towards a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm," in *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 14–31.

64. Douglas V. Johnson and Steven Metz, *American Civil–Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).

65. Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review* 55 (June 2002): 9–59.

inclined to launch debates about macro-political issues, as Kohn nostalgically suggests. Ultimately, direct dialogue empowers military thought.

Finally, the market works through a cultural impact that affects the military's interests and values. As armies find themselves struggling for resources in a competitive environment, they learn how to pursue alternative sources of legitimacy. This leads them to adapt themselves to the hegemonic culture of the market economy. Pursuit of legitimation drives armies to borrow organizational methods from commercial organizations. Even military language emulates market language through terms such as "battle management" and "just-in-time warfare." Flattening the military hierarchy, allowing lower levels of the hierarchy to exercise initiative, and borrowing methods of the "virtual corporation" by contracting out non-combat functions are some manifestations of this trend,[66] creating a post-fordist type of the military.[67] However, the long-term implications of such market-oriented reforms on the military ethos and on the military doctrine and the impact of these on civilian monitoring of military operations, for example, have not been dealt with as seriously as the historical recruitment debates.

Unlike the "gold sacrificers," the "body sacrificers" of the volunteer armies accept their sacrifice, either because of the social value they ascribe to military service or because of their inability to instigate collective action, typical of the lower-middle class. Furthermore, insofar as the republican concept of politics is based on the exchange of military obligations for civil rights, declining levels of military participation, resulting from falling rates of conscription and diminished participation in warfare, imply a reduction of the bargaining power for political participation.[68] Under these conditions, military policies are less politically controlled. For instance, while bereaved mother Cindy Sheehan—whose son fell in Iraq—was effective in igniting a short-term protest against the war, the majority of bereaved families accept the notion that they have honorably contributed to the national project. Therefore, they have remained politically passive or supportive.[69]

This suggests that it is becoming easier to deploy volunteer forces for disputed political goals. Drawing from Vasquez, the relatively low level of selectivity entailed by conscription directly touches more powerful actors than voluntary service. These actors may utilize their political power to constrain policymakers

66. Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization* (Washington: Rand, 1997).

67. Christopher Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies," *The British Journal of Sociology* 45 (December 1994): 637–54; Anthony King, "The Post-Fordist Military," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 34 (January 2006): 359–74.

68. Silver, "Labor, War and World Politics."

69. Jemima Repo, *Gendering the Militarization of the War on Terrorism: Discourses and Representations of Masculinities and Femininities*, Master Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2006, 112–13.

by means of collective action. Likewise, the broad distribution of the costs of war throughout society, as is the case with conscription, drives politicians to pursue casualty-averse policies so as to avoid the political costs entailed by military hostilities.[70] With the shift to AVFs, though, these rules work in the opposite direction. Bacevich has summed up this trend by claiming that

> when it came to invading Iraq, President Bush paid little attention to what voters of the First District of Massachusetts or the Fiftieth District of California thought. The people had long-since forfeited any ownership of the army. Even today, although a clear majority of Americans want the Iraq war shut down, their opposition counts for next to nothing: the will of the commander-in-chief prevails. . .. If "they"—the soldiers we contract to defend us—get in trouble, "we" feel little or no obligation to bail them out.[71]

Add to this the reduced pressures from taxpayers owing to the tax cuts that accompanied the war and it is easy enough to understand the low profile of protest. "Where Have All the Protesters Gone?" asked Andrew Rosenthal of the *New York Times* with regard to the war in Iraq, to which he answers:

> Because there is no draft. . . no young person has to fear being conscripted into the fight. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Americans find it much easier to stay silent when there is no shared sacrifice.[72]

However, the claim that links the manpower system to political sensitivity to casualties is highly debated. Scholars contend that casualty sensitivity is affected by: (1) the extent to which the war is portrayed as successful in achieving its original goals;[73] (2) the definition of the goals of the war in relation to the level of external threat;[74] (3) the number of casualties,[75] and other factors.

Still, the level of performance, number of casualties, and public support for goals being equal, the model of recruitment determines the likelihood of collective action that will either restrain or tolerate high-casualty warfare. Recruitment (as a product of the reward system) affects civilian control by affecting the bargaining power of the sacrificing groups.

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70. Vasquez, "Shouldering the Soldiering."

71. Bacevich, "The Failure."

72. Andrew Rosenthal, "There is Silence in the Streets; Where Have All the Protesters Gone?" *New York Times*, 31 August 2006.

73. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 10–12.

74. Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (March 1992): 49–74.

75. John Mueller, "The Iraq Syndrome," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (November/December 2005): 44–54.

With the differentiation of sacrifice/voice, it is hardly surprising that Kohn expresses the paradox of civilian control over the armed forces in the postmodern era by noting that even though the public has more tools to supervise the military, it has less incentive to do so.[76] Declining levels of public concern is a major feature of the decline in republican control.

Commodification: Market Regulation of the Service

Vocational armies have brought military service back into the labor market. In other words, the military profession has been commodified. Advocates of the republican conception of citizenship have criticized this trend on the grounds that "to turn such service into a commodity—a job for pay—is to corrupt or degrade the sense of civic virtue that properly attends it."[77] To be sure, the mode of bargaining that typified the republican style of control vanishes. When imbued with symbols of civic duty, conscription may construct political expectations that derive from the very nature of the military mission (such as ideological fulfillment and serving the nation). As Cortright has noted, the greatest dissent in Vietnam came not from draftees but from volunteers, who felt that their expectations for rewards that could be valuable in civilian life were not being met.[78] To recall, the legitimization of war and war preparation have historically rested on rewarding not only the recruits themselves, but also, and often primarily, the social groups that send their children to military service.

Commodified military service, however, lowers such expectations and reshapes the contractual relations between the soldier and the state. That is, the exchange between the state and social groups shifts to the level of military (employer)-recruits (employees). The ability of enlistees to support their families is at stake, and not their ideological grievances. Soldiers' support for military missions is then "purchased" rather than politically mobilized. As labor is hired through the market, rather than conscripted through coercive state mechanisms, the military, as an employer, must persuade the labor pool that working for it is attractive. Marketing military service means relying on monetary attractions rather than reinforcing the political legitimation of war and war preparation among potential enlistees and their social networks. Material rewards regulate the level of military staffing. In the U.S., for instance, it would appear that only very generous financial bonuses have enabled the army to meet its recruitment quotas since 2006 to make it possible to implement the administration's decisions to send more troops to Iraq.[79] It is safe to assume that otherwise pressures to withdraw the troops may have mounted.

76. Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control."

77. Michael J. Sandel, "What Money Shouldn't Buy," *Hedgehog Review* 5 (June 2003): 77–97.

78. David Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2005).

79. See Korb and Duggan, "An All-Volunteer Army."

Selective recruitment, moreover, naturally screens out potential war opponents. Indeed, political mapping of the armed forces shows a strong affiliation with the Republican Party among Military Academy and ROTC cadets that is also correlated with support for sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.[80] Furthermore, because American conscientious objectors during the Vietnam War emphasized universal rights rather than obligations and denied the legitimacy of conscription,[81] the abolition of the draft pulled the carpet from under the feet of those endeavoring to use conscription to delegitimize war. Naturally, the rate of conscientious objectors has dropped since the establishment of the AVF.[82]

Even the type of soldiers' protest has been changed. During the Iraq War a new antiwar movement was fomented by a group of junior members of the military, including reservists, calling for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq within the framework of *An Appeal for Redress from the War in Iraq*. About 2,000 soldiers signed the appeal (as of January 2008). Yet, unlike the massive revolt of enlistees in Vietnam who opposed the war by legal and illegal means, the new pattern of protest largely abides by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and airs protest mostly through the distribution of petitions to congresspersons. In a commodified military, the source of protest and disobedience is much weaker and more conservative. Commodification depoliticizes, or maybe repoliticizes the ranks (by cultivating warlike sentiments) and thus enlarges the military's freedom of action and autonomy.

This pattern of *Appeal* typifies the AVF from another angle. Voluntarism means that those who made their choice to serve claim to speak for the others. "Implicit in the appeal," claimed Bacevich, "is the suggestion that national-security policies somehow require the consent of those in uniform."[83] In other words, with the waning of the republican model, in which civilian networks expressed the soldiers' voice, much of this political task is transferred to the soldiers themselves. This could be an extended form of military unionism that has already penetrated some Western military organizations; again another appearance of market control from within.

Commodification may also decrease the level of protest from the ranks by other means. Apart from variables such as the nature of combat, the political

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80. David E. Rohall, Morten G. Ender, and Michael D. Matthews, "The Effects of Military Affiliation, Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," *Armed Forces & Society* 33 (Fall 2006): 59–77.

81. Dan Lainer-Vos, "Social Movements and Citizenship: Conscientious Objection in France, the United States and Israel," *Mobilization* 11 (October 2006): 277–95.

82. Chambers, "The United States."

83. Andrew J. Bacevich, "Warrior Politics," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200705/military-dissent.

climate, the norms that soldiers import from their civilian environment, the effectiveness of the military's command, and other variables,[84] two main factors lessen intra-military dissent.

First, the increased level of unit cohesiveness due to longer terms of service (relative to the draft) may encourage the primary group to pursue goals that are at odds with those of the formal organization and lead to collective acts of indiscipline and low restraint.[85] Likewise, cohesiveness decreases the likelihood that information regarding the use of violence that contravenes military norms would be leaked.

Second, as military service is perceived by relatively peripheral groups as a route to social mobility, their identification with military missions is more pronounced. This accounts for the more critical significance of battlefield achievements, which in turn shape the level of symbolic rewards. Drawing from theories of collective action, the availability of a good alternative outside the organization increases the likelihood that soldiers will react strongly to any dissatisfaction.[86] In the context of military service, dissatisfaction may result from a situation that generates inconsistency with the soldier's imported ethic. Being of lower status implies having reduced alternatives, thus making conservative responses more likely. This is especially so with regard to hired soldiers.[87]

Commodification may also encourage militarization of politics. Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing tendency in the U.S. to portray soldierly virtues as the ideal embodiment of citizenship.[88] To some extent, praising soldiers can serve (not necessarily intentionally) as a mechanism for reproducing symbolic rewards. This may lower the potential monetary costs of hiring soldiers by ascribing significance to their service as a motivating mechanism. The neo-liberal era's verbal compliments have replaced the generous welfare state of the past. This is not to claim that U.S. soldiers enjoy increased symbolic rewards. As long as privileged groups desist from volunteering, political culture will remain stronger than the rhetoric that holds the soldier up as the paradigmatic citizen. The soldiering-citizenship link is thus only partially reinscribed, and even then only among the lower-middle class and ethnic minorities. As Bacevich rightly

84. See Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Variation in Sexual Violence during War," *Politics & Society* 34 (September 2006): 307–42.

85. Elizabeth Kier "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," *International Security* 23 (Fall 1998), 15–16.

86. William E. Lyons and David Lowery, "The Organization of Political Space and Citizen Responses to Dissatisfaction in Urban Communities: An Integrative Model," *The Journal of Politics* 48 (May 1986): 321–46.

87. Tamar Liebes and Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada," *Armed Forces & Society* 21 (Fall 1994): 45–68.

88. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*.

claims, this portrayal is one of the main driving forces behind America's remilitarization.

Technologization also plays a part in weakening civilian control. The use of technology in place of human combatants (the "Revolution in Military Affairs") reduces the military participation ratio thanks to the ability to wage wars that do not require mass enlistment or popular mobilization, which may generate pressures for expanded rights or benefits.[89]

Technologization and commodification go hand in hand. The use of complex weaponry systems is morally invoked to justify recruiting soldiers on long-term contracts.[90] Moreover, technologization increases the convergence between the military and the high-tech private sector that may lead to the execution of military tasks by private firms, such as the military's reliance on commercial space technology for communications, even during war.[91] In sum, both a skilled labor force and privatization add to the infrastructure for further technologization.

To go one step further, as soldiering comes to be regulated by the market, the door is gradually opened to the supply of supplementary military services by private companies and even the return of mercenaries. Privatization raises the issue of accountability as companies' operations allow the state to determine and implement military policies without public debate, while the firms themselves accumulate autonomous power.[92] For example, with the presence of about 60,000 private security personnel in Iraq (in 2004), reduced troop casualties lowered the political costs of a prolonged war.[93] Thus, the potential reversion to new modes of mercenarism makes more likely the renewal of excess autonomy for the violent institutions that typified the pre-state era of mercenarism, when armies were insulated from society. Once again, civilian supervision is restricted by the market. Furthermore, privatization may offer citizen-customers more and more

89. Paul Starr, "War and Liberalism," *The New Republic*, 3 May 2007, 21–23.

90. Robert K. Fullinwider, "Conscription—No," *Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly* 23 (Summer 2003), 10.

91. Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, "Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications," *Air Force Law Review* 55 (Winter 2004) (internet edition), www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/browse_JJ_A187.

92. Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert Mandel, "The Privatization of Security," *Armed Forces & Society* 28 (Fall 2001): 129–51; Ann R. Markusen, "The Case Against Privatizing National Security," *Governance* 16 (July 2003): 471–501; Patricia M. Shields, "Military Privatization: The Normative/Affective Context," paper presented at the Second Annual Conference, Society for the Advancement of Socioeconomics, Washington, DC, March 1990; Peter Warren Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 228.

93. Deborah D. Avant. "Contracting for Services in U.S. Military Operations,"*PS, Political Science & Politics* 40 (July 2007): 457–61.

alternative products from which they can select those that they prefer, such as bomb shelters, private policing, and more. Market participation again replaces political participation.

In sum, smaller militaries, commodification combined with social alterations of the military, technologization, and privatization all serve to heighten the military's insulation from citizens' demands, while market pressures act as the main determinant of the military's resources. It is clear that the same mechanisms through which the symbolic reward system affected republican control (Figure 1) now work to mediate between material rewards and market control: the middle class' bargaining power has weakened due to the (1) military's reliance on a smaller and less powerful part of the population and (2) the diverging of "gold" and "body" sacrificers, with the original power of the middle class partly shifting to the market-based monitoring of military resources. At the same time, the likelihood that antiwar protests will emerge from the ranks and their social networks has decreased due to the commodification of military service. Finally, recruitment disputes have partly been replaced by market regulation, such as the "Opt Out Campaign" and market-inspired organizational reforms. Needless to say, with shrinking welfare benefits and selective recruitment to AVFs, the mechanisms of active citizenship and political trust, respectively, have lost their merit.

Conclusion

Market control over the armed forces signifies a new stage in the evolution of civilian control, with clear distinctions between the republican and market forms, as schematically presented in Table 1.

In short, the republican model is characterized by direct political participation mediated by political institutions that aim at shaping policies regarding war and peace through the monitoring of the military. With its monopolistic status as a public service, the military is targeted by collective action. Its performance is therefore bounded by public consent. Symbolically motivated middle-class groups are the core bearers of such collective action, functioning simultaneously as citizen-soldiers and citizen-taxpayers.

In contrast, the market model of control is characterized by direct and indirect pressures exerted by market forces on political institutions, with a focus on the military's resources as a commodified, capital-intensive organization, along with the market regulation of recruitment. Military performance and political goals are mediated by resource management. Functioning in a competitive climate, the very need to adjust to market requisites shapes the organization's space of action. The distinction between middle class groups as "gold sacrificers" versus

Table 1
Republican versus market control

Variable	Republican control	Market control
Motivating rewards	Symbolic	Material
Social composition of sacrificers	Mainly middle class groups as both "body" and "gold" sacrificers	Distinction between middle class as "gold sacrificers" versus lower-middle class and minority groups as "body sacrificers"
Essence of military service	Civic duty	Commodified service
Medium of control	Direct political participation mediated by political institutions	Direct and indirect market pressures exerted on political institutions, and market-regulation of recruitment
Focus of monitoring	The political impact of military performance	The military's resources
The military's status	Monopoly over violent resources in society	Functioning in a competitive environment
Impact on military's freedom of operation	Bounded by political consent	More insulated from citizens' demands but limited by resource allocation

lower-middle class and minority groups as "body sacrificers" is fundamental to this mode of control.

Market control has contradictory effects on the army's freedom of operation: on the one hand, the military is provided with greater freedom of action in administering belligerent policies, largely because of the decline of institutional control, the changes in its social composition, the commodified relations with its recruits, and the direct dialogue with the public. The military's relative insulation from citizens' demands means that it is more easily deployed for disputable political goals. On the other hand, increased market-oriented monitoring leaves the army with fewer resources with which to fund these policies. Freedom of

action is not symmetrical with the army's shrinking resources. Thus, only economically low-cost military build-up can command a high level of legitimation, or at least hinder the formation of an effective antiwar front. This conclusion may add credence to studies showing that democracies tend to fight low-cost, short wars.[94]

It has been claimed in this article that the mode of reward affects the mode of civilian control. Perhaps this causal logic could be challenged by claiming that the military participation ratio or the mode of recruitment is the independent variable rather than the mode of reward. After all, the mediating mechanisms (see Figure 1) appeared in mass drafted armies and were modified when selective volunteer forces came to the fore. However, neither the size of the military nor the method of recruitment brings youngsters to the ranks, but rather the reward system. It is the reward system that creates the conditions for translating military participation into political power by molding the contractual relations between the state, on the one hand, and recruits and their social networks, on the other. Recruits' expectations result from the type of contract that in turn affects the power they and their social networks strive to gain. Power is displayed both in the way that they enter into dialogue with the army and the state as well as in the focus of that dialogue: either public or private interests. Furthermore, the size of the military is a dependent, not independent variable, and, as long as democracies are incapable of funding a mass army of hired soldiers, it is the reward system that determines the size of the army. Likewise, even an elitist military may produce republican control if the symbolic resources that servicepersons can accrue are the main motivating factor for signing up.

At another level, and following Lukes, this article has suggested moving from a one-dimensional to a three-dimensional view of the encounter between political and military elites, from observable processes to power structure. As argued above, negotiations between generals and politicians over military resources are not autonomous but are determined by the market-oriented pressures that diminish (or increase) them. Likewise, both generals' claims for operative freedom and politicians' ability to restrain the military are determined by the existence or lack of external pressures, mainly in the form of antiwar collective action or political passivity. Republicanism, as much as marketism, provides the political-cultural coordinates for the institutional encounter between generals and politicians.

Perhaps one might claim that there is nothing very novel in the transition from republican to market control. After all, Western societies utilized private

94. See for example Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (April 2004): 296–313; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

mechanisms to offer incentives for others to fight their wars in the past. What is new, however, is the change in the power structure within which Western armed forces function. Replacing mercenaries by citizen-armies was not merely to change the mode of recruitment; more importantly, with the French model of the citizen-soldier, military service became a civilian symbol, part of the state's definition of its identity. The military was no longer provided with its manpower by the labor market but rather by the coercive state, as a mechanism by which the state monopolized its control over the local population as well as over the arms in the population's possession.[95] War management and war preparation were thus largely politicized.

Nowadays, politics has retreated in the face of the market just as the violent apparatuses of the state have increased their destructive power. Legitimation for the use of force is still high, though it is becoming less legitimate to make sacrifices while doing so (as demonstrated by the syndromes of "casualty phobia" and "small government"), thus propelling the state to create less costly mechanisms internally but also more destructive externally. With the demise of mass industrial wars, small-scale counter-insurgency warfare fought by professional combat teams is becoming the model, assisted by private mechanisms. This combination poses a real challenge to the political community's ability to supervise the state's mechanisms of violence. We have come a long way from the pre-state reality in which the market regulated recruitment; then, however, violent power was still diffused.

This article is not a manifesto for the revival of the draft and the idea that loyalty to the community should be exhibited and reinforced by citizens' willingness to carry out the duty of military service. On the other hand, though, it can be read as a warning about the consequences for civilian control that result when politics decline in favor of the market.

95. Janice E. Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms and the Decline of Mercenarism," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (March 1990): 23–47.